Preventing Self-fulfilling debt crises by Szkup, Michal
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Preventing Self-fulfilling debt crises
Michal Szkup
University of British Columbia
June 2017
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/82754/
MPRA Paper No. 82754, posted 19 November 2017 05:32 UTC
Preventing Self-fullling Debt Crises
Michal Szkup
University of British Columbia
Abstract
This paper asks whether a government can implement poli-
cies that help to avert a crisis driven by self-fullling expec-
tations. I consider two policies that are often at the center of
political discussions, namely austerity and scal stimulus. I nd
that under plausible conditions austerity tends to decrease the
probability of a debt crisis, while stimulus tends to increase it.
I also show that endogenous expectations amplify the e¤ects of
government policies so that even a small policy adjustment can
have signicant e¤ects. Finally, I nd that policy uncertainty
further increases the attractiveness of austerity versus stimulus,
but tends to decrease the overall impact of both policies.
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[...] the assessment of the Governing Council is that we are in a sit-
uation now where you have large parts of the Euro Area in what we call
a bad equilibrium, namely an equilibrium where you have self-fullling ex-
pectations. [...] So, there is a case for intervening, in a sense, to break
these expectations.
Mario Draghi, Press Conference, Frankfurt am Main, September 6, 2012
Sovereign debt crises are a recurrent phenomenon. After the turbulent
1980s and a series of defaults in the late 1990s and early 2000s, sovereign
defaults once again became a hotly debated topic. One of the leading views
on the sovereign defaults, as exemplied by the above quote, is that they
are the result of an interplay between poor economic fundamentals and
self-fullling expectations.1
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Figure 1: Economic and policy uncertainty in Europe 2005-2014.
It is important to note that condence crises do not appear out of
nowhere, but rather are preceded by a deterioration of a debtor country
economic situation and an increase in economic and political uncertainty.
Since investors often have access to di¤erent sources of private information
(or vary in their interpretation of common information), this increase in un-
certainty translates into an increased dispersion of beliefs among investors.
As the consequence, individual investors afraid that other investors hold
more pessimistic beliefs about the debtor countrys economic situation may
choose not extend new loans, even if they believe that debtor country is
1See also Bocola and Dovis (2016), Conesa and Kehoe (2015), or De Grauwe and Ji
(2013).
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solvent, triggering a default. Indeed, as shown in Figure 1, the recent Eu-
ropean debt crisis was accompanied by both an increase in dispersion of
beliefs about the future economic prospects of EU countries (Panel A) and
an increase in economic policy uncertainty (Panel B).
Motivated by these observations, in this paper I ask (1) whether a gov-
ernment can implement policies that help to avert a crisis driven by self-
fullling expectations and (2) how the desirability of such policies depends
on market participantsexpectations and on the presence of economic pol-
icy uncertainty. I focus on two policies that have been at the center of
political discussion in Europe during the recent debt crisis, namely aus-
terity and scal stimulus (see Brunnermeier et al. (2016), Corsetti (2012)
and Reinhart and Rogo¤ (2010)). My ndings suggests that under plausi-
ble conditions austerity tends to decrease the probability of an imminent
crisis, while stimulus tends to increase it.2 I also show that endogenous
expectations amplify the e¤ects of government policies so that even a small
policy adjustment can have signicant e¤ects. Finally, I nd that presence
policy uncertainty further increases the attractiveness of austerity versus
stimulus, but tends to decreases the overall impact of government policies.
The paper consists of two parts. In the rst part, I develop a model
of self-fullling debt crises where crises arise as a result of an interplay
between poor fundamentals, foreign lenders expectations, and domestic
households expectations. To model dispersed beliefs and to endogenize
expectations about sovereign default I assume that lenders and households
do not observe the relevant fundamentals of the economy but instead only
receive noisy private signals. This realistic assumption not only captures
the uncertainty surrounding the state of the economy during crises episodes,
but also transforms lendersand householdsexpectations into endogenous
equilibrium objects and restores the uniqueness of equilibrium within the
class of monotone equilibria.3 The resulting environment is rich enough to
2To be precise, I provide conditions under which austerity and scal stimulus decrease
probability of default and conditions under which they increase it. However, I argue that
the conditions under which stimulus work are unlikely to hold in practice, while those
for austerity to work are likely to be satised.
3Even though the model has a unique equilibrium outcome, a debt crisis is still
driven by expectations in the following sense: There is a region of the fundamentals
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capture main trade-o¤s faced by governments during debt crises, but, in
contrast to standard models of self-fullling sovereign debt crises, it also
links beliefs and expectations to economic fundamentals.
In the second part of the paper, I use the model to analyze which poli-
cies available to the government can decrease the ex-ante likelihood of a
debt crisis (i.e., prevent a debt crisis). I show rst that a change in the
probability of default implied by any policy adjustment can be decom-
posed into the product of the direct e¤ect(the initial e¤ect of the policy
change on the governments incentive to default holding householdsand
lendersbeliefs constant) and the multiplier e¤ect(the change in the gov-
ernments default decision implied by the adjustment in householdsand
lendersexpectations). I show that the direct e¤ect determines whether
a given policy decreases or increases the likelihood of a crisis, while the
multiplier e¤ect, which captures the role played by expectations, acts like
an amplication mechanism that always magnies the initial response of
the economy. These novel results indicate that if the government wants
to avoid default, it can use expectations to its own advantage as even a
small policy change, when amplied by adjustments in expectations can
signicantly decrease the likelihood of default.
I use the above observations to analyze the impact of an adjustment
in a tax rate and the impact of a scal stimulus on the probability of
default. In the model, increasing taxes decrease the governments incentives
to default by lling the nancing gap faced by the government when lenders
are unwilling to provide the funding. On the other hand, higher taxes
distort investment and decrease future output making it more di¢ cult for
the government to repay the debt later on. I nd that an increase in a
tax rate tends to decrease the probability of default as long as the initial
level of taxes is not very highand argue that this condition is typically
satised in practice. I model a scal stimulus as an increase in government
investment nanced with debt. A scal stimulus, by increasing the output
of the economy, and hence government tax revenues, tends to decrease
where both crisis and no crisis outcomes are consistent with fundamentals and whether
a crisis occurs depends only on agentsexpectations. If agents expect default, then a
crisis occurs, while if they expect repayment, then the government will indeed repay the
debt; in that sense, a crisis is self-fullling (see Morris and Shin, 1998).
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the governments incentives to default. On the other hand, the associated
increase in the government debt makes defaulting more attractive. I show
that the positive e¤ect dominates if the ratio of the government debt to
the initial stock of capital in the economy is su¢ ciently high. However, I
argue that the conditions under which stimulus works are unlikely to hold
in practice. It follows that austerity is typically a preferred option.
The above analysis was conducted under the assumption that the gov-
ernment always implements its announced policies. However, often debt
crises are accompanied by a substantial uncertainty as to whether the gov-
ernment will go through with its plans (e.g., see Panizza et al. (2009)).
Indeed, according to the recent index of economic political uncertainty con-
structed by Baker et al. (2016) this uncertainty reached historical heights
in Europe during the recent debt crises (Panel B of Figure 1). Motivated
by these observations I analyze how the presence of such an uncertainty
a¤ects the above results.
I nd that the presence of such an uncertainty tends to decrease the
negative e¤ect of austerity: Uncertain as to whether higher taxes will be
implemented households do not decrease their investment as much as they
would otherwise. On the other hand, economic policy uncertainty decreases
the benets of scal stimulus: Unsure whether stimulus will be imple-
mented or not households do not expand their investment as much as they
would otherwise. Thus, the presence of economic policy uncertainty further
strengthen the case for austerity relative to scal stimulus.
However, I also nd that economic policy uncertainty decreases overall
e¤ect that both policies have on the probability of default. This is because
agents, uncertain about the nal government decisions, do not adjust their
expectations about the likelihood of default as much as they do in the
absence of economic policy uncertainty, which implies that the amplifying
e¤ect of endogenous adjustments in expectations is weak. In the extreme
case, when a policy change is unexpected and agentsinformation is very
precise, the multiplier e¤ect is completely missing and government policies
cease to have any impact on the probability of default. This last result
provides a strong warning against unexpected policy U-turns.
In the nal part of the paper, I investigate numerically how the ef-
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fectiveness of the policies described above depends on the values of the
models main parameters. In addition, I investigate the importance of the
endogenous expectations (as captured by the multiplier e¤ect) in driving
these adjustments and link their importance to the characteristics of the
economy. The numerical results suggest that for reasonable values of para-
meters an increase in the tax rate tends to decrease while a scal stimulus
tends to increase the probability of default and that these results are robust
to alternative choices of parameters. Thus, both numerical and analytical
results indicate that austerity is preferred to stimulus as a way of prevent-
ing a debt crisis. As such these results provide a support for the policies
adopted by European countries during the recent debt crisis.
Related Literature  The framework developed in the paper unies
two popular approaches to modeling self-fullling debt crises: the micro-
funded general equilibrium approach of Cole and Kehoe (2000) and the
game-theoretic approach of global games as in Corsetti et al. (2006) and
Morris and Shin (2006). The key di¤erence between my model and that of
Cole and Kehoe (2000) lies in the information structure, which captures the
uncertainty surrounding debt crises and which leads to a unique equilib-
rium in my model. The equilibrium uniqueness follows from global games
literature as started by Carlsson and Damme (1993) and Morris and Shin
(1998). Corsetti et al. (2006) and Morris and Shin (2006) use reduced-form
global game models to study the e¤ectiveness of IMF assistance in prevent-
ing a self-fullling debt crisis and the moral hazard such assistance creates.4
In a parallel work, Zabai (2014), uses global games to study how tax and
borrowing policies can be used by the government to manage probability
of default in a model in the spirit of Calvo (1988). In contrast to the above
work, the focus of this paper is on understanding the impact that endoge-
nous expectations and policy uncertainty have on the e¤ectiveness of scal
policies.
Models of self-fullling crises have a long tradition in the literature on
sovereign default, beginning with Sachs (1984) and Calvo (1988). Following
the debt crisis in Europe, this literature has experienced a revival. Corsetti
4See also Zwart (2007) for the signaling e¤ects of IMF policy choices in a global game
model of sovereign debt crisis. Morris and Shin (2003) provide an excellent survey of
the early global games literature.
6
and Dedola (2011), Corsetti and Dedola (2016), and Aguiar et al. (2013)
investigate how monetary policy can help to avoid a crisis. Lorenzoni and
Werning (2013) focus on the role of the interest rate as the main driver of
sovereign default. Finally, Cooper (2013) studies the role of debt guarantees
as a way to avert a crisis within a federation of countries.
This paper is also related to the literature on sovereign debt in the
spirit of Eaton and Gersovitz (1981), which is summarized well in Aguiar
and Amador (2014) and Panizza et al. (2009). More recently, this line of
research has focused on developing quantitative models of sovereign de-
fault that can account for the observed dynamics surrounding the default
episodes. (See Aguiara and Gopinath (2006), Arellano (2008), Hatchondo
and Martinez (2009), or Mendoza and Yue (2012), and references therein,
for more on quantitative models of sovereign default.) Cuadra and Sapriza
(2008) study quantitatively the role of political uncertainty. Typically, this
strand of literature assumes away the possibility of a belief-driven crisis.
A large body of work, motivated by the recent events in Europe, studies
possible policy responses to the recession that accompanied the European
debt crisis. Several papers use DSGE models to evaluate the e¤ectiveness
of various policies. For example, Eggertsson et al. (2014) study the e¤ects
of structural reforms, while Corsetti et al. (2013) investigate the e¤ects of
expansionary scal policy. My work complements these papers by providing
an analysis of austerity and scal stimulus in an environment with a self-
fullling debt crisis and dispersed beliefs.
1 Model
There are two periods, t = 1; 2; and three types of agents: a continuum
of identical households, a continuum of identical lenders, and the govern-
ment. The economy is characterized by the average productivity level A,
which is distributed according to a normal distribution with mean A 1 and
standard deviation A - that is A  N (A 1; 2A). Here, A 1 denotes the
past average productivity level in the economy, which all agents know. The
current average level of productivity, A, is realized at the beginning of pe-
riod 1 and is constant across the two periods, but it is initially unobserved
by the agents. Instead, households and lenders receive private noisy signals
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about A; its value is revealed to everyone at the end of period 1.
1.1 Households
There is a continuum of identical households, indexed by i 2 [0; 1].
Households are risk averse and have preferences given byX
t=1;2
[log (ct) + log (gt)] ;
where ct is private consumption and gt is government spending. Each
household initially is endowed with the same amount of capital k1, and has
access to a production function:
yit = eZeAif  kit ,
where f (k) = k, 0 <  < 1. Here, Ai is a household-specic produc-
tivity level; eZ is the aggregate productivity level, which depends on the
governments default decision; and f is a production function that takes
as inputs capital and, implicitly, inelastically supplied labor. The proceeds
from production are the only source of income for the household and are
taxed at a rate  > 0. Finally, capital is assumed to fully depreciate each
period.5
Households receive their idiosyncratic productivity shocks Ai at the
beginning of period t = 1. The idiosyncratic productivity is constant across
time and given by
Ai = A+ "i,
where "i is i:i:d: across households and is uniformly distributed on [ "; "],
" > 0. Note that this implies that A is the average level of productivity
in the economy, and that knowing A is equivalent to knowing the aggre-
gate output. After the households observe their respective productivity
realizations, household i makes its investment decision, that is it choose
its capital stock, ki2, for period 2. Households make these choices before eZ
is determined (and before the actual production takes place). Thus, when
making their investment decisions, households face uncertainty regarding
5The assumption that capital fully depreciates implies that the householdsoptimal
investment choice is linear in eAi , which simplies the subsequent analysis.
8
their future income.6 Households are committed to their investment deci-
sions; they cannot adjust them later. The production takes place at the
end of period 1, after eZ is determined, at which point the households invest
the amount chosen earlier and consume the rest of their income.
Households make no decisions in period 2. They simply use their capital
to produce, and they consume all of their after-tax income.
1.2 The Government
The government is benevolent and maximizes householdsutility. In
each period t, it provides households with public consumption goods, gt,
and nances its expenditure by taxing householdsincome and (in period
1) by borrowing in the bond market. The government enters period 1 with
a legacy debt, B1, which is due later in this period, and it initially does
not observe the average level of productivity in the economy, A.
At the beginning of period 1, the government announces an interest
rate r > 0 at which it is willing to borrow in the bond market. Once
the households and lenders make their choices, the government observes
A and decides how much to borrow, B2; whether to default or not, d1;
and how much of public goods to provide to households, g1. In period 2,
the government repays its debt B2, if it did not default on it earlier, and
provides g2 to households. The government can default only in period 1,
in which case it defaults on all of its debt.7
Following the large literature on sovereign default, I assume that default
is costly and associated with a drop in aggregate productivity (and, hence,
in output) by a factor Z. In particular, when the government defaults, eZ
takes a value Z < 1, while eZ = 1 otherwise. There is also an additional
cost of default: If the government issues a positive amount of debt at t = 1
6This assumption captures two realistic features of an investment process. First, in-
vestment takes time and often requires prior planning. Second, investment decisions are
made under uncertainty regarding future economic conditions (in this case, uncertainty
about eZ).
7I allow for default in period 1 only, because of an inherent asymmetry between the
two periods in the model. Since period 2 is the last period of the model, it is hard to
support repayment as an equilibrium outcome in that period  compared to period 1
because in period 2 the government faces much smaller costs of default and lacks the
ability to roll over part of its debt.
9
(i.e., B2 > 0) and then decides to default, it faces a further cost of default
equal to B2, 0 <   1. I interpret B2 as a litigation costassociated
with the legal battles between bondholders and the government following
a default.8
1.3 Lenders and the Bond Market
There is a continuum of identical, risk-neutral lenders, indexed by j 2
[0; 1], each with nite wealth b > 0. Lenders choose at t = 1 whether to
participate in the bond market or invest in a risk-free asset. The net return
on the risk-free asset is normalized to 0, while the return from participating
in the bond market is endogenous and determined in equilibrium. Lenders
do not observe the realization of the average productivity; instead, each
lender j observes a private signal xj about A where
xj = A+ vj, vj  N
 
0; 2x

,
with vj being i:i:d: across lenders and independent of A and "i.
Only the government and lenders have access to the bond market. I
assume that the government has all the market power in the bond market,
and therefore, the government sets an interest rate r at which it is willing
to borrow new funds. Taking r as given, lenders decide whether to supply
their funds to the bond market, determining the total funds available in
the bond market, S. The government then chooses its new borrowing, B2,
where B2 2 [0; S]. After the government raises new funds, the bond market
shuts down and lenders invest the funds not borrowed by the government
in storage. For each unit of funds lent to the government, lender j receives
a gross return of 1 + r in period t = 2 if the government repays its debt,
and nothing otherwise.
The above bond market structure di¤ers substantially from a Walrasian
market typically considered in the sovereign debt literature. However, the
8Following a default, creditors tend to le a substantial number of lawsuits against a
defaulting government. For example, in the case of default by Argentina in 2001, there
were over 140 lawsuits led abroad, including 15 class action lawsuits, in addition to a
large number of lawsuits led in Argentine courts (Panizza et al. (2009)). I interpret B2
as the costs to the government associated with these legal battles. For more discussion
of this assumption, see Section 2:1 below.
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assumption that the government has all the market power in the bond mar-
ket and the resulting lack of learning from prices are not unrealistic. Most
governments issue debt using sealed-bid auctions and have considerable
leeway in choosing the amount of borrowing based on the bids e¤ectively
controlling the volume and, to a lesser extent, the price.9 This auctioning
mechanism also means that the price in the primary bond market cannot
be used directly to infer any information.
1.4 Timing
A  is 
realized
Choice of r 
Shocks &
signals 
Households'
and lenders' 
decisions
The government's
decisions {B2,d1,g1} 
Production and
consumption
t=1 t=2
    Zd1 is 
determined
Figure 2: Timeline
The timing of period 1 is summarized in Figure 2. At the beginning
of period 1; nature draws the productivity level A, which is initially un-
observed by the government as well as by the households and the lenders.
Then, based only on the information contained in the prior belief, the gov-
ernment sets an interest rate r, at which it is willing to borrow from the
lenders. Once r is announced, households receive their idiosyncratic pro-
ductivity shocks and lenders observe their private noisy signals about A.
Given their productivity shocks, households choose how much they want to
invest, while lenders, using their private signals, decide whether to supply
their funds in the market. At this point, the government learns the true A,
and based on lendersand householdsdecisions and the realization of A,
9For example, Spanish government provides only a lower and upper bound on the
amount of funds accompanied by a note which says that The announced issuance
target is indicative and it may be modied according to market conditions (for more
information see http://www.tesoro.es/en). What this means is that typically if the
demand is strong and bids are high the government will decide to issue more debt and
at lower interest rate then if the demand is weak and bids are low. Thus e¤ectively the
government controls both the volume and to some extent the interest rate on its debt.
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it decides how much it will borrow today, B2, whether to default or not,
d1, and how much of public goods to provide to households, g1. Once the
government borrows its desired amount, the bond market shuts down and
the lenders remaining funds are invested in the risk-free asset. Finally,
at the end of the period, production, actual investment, and consumption
take place and the average productivity level is revealed to all the agents.
Period 2 is much simpler. At the beginning of the period, production
takes place. Then the government collects the taxes, provides public goods,
g2, and, if it did not default earlier, repays its remaining debt. Finally,
households consume their after-tax output.
2 Equilibrium Analysis
An equilibrium in the model is dened as follows:
Denition 1 An equilibrium is a set of government policy functions {r,
d1, g1, g2, B2} a prole of householdsconsumption and investment choices
fc1; c2; k2gi2[0;1], a prole of lenderssupply decisions fgj2[0;1], such that:
1. fr; d1; g1; g2; B2g solves the governments problems at t = 1,2, taking
householdsand lendersdecisions as given.
2. For every i, fci1; ci2; ki2g solves household is problems at t = 1,2, taking
as given the other agentsdecisions.
3. For every j; j solves lender js problem, taking as given the other
agentsdecisions.
The above denition of an equilibrium is standard, and it requires that
all the agents behave optimally in each subgame, taking as given the actions
of the others. It also requires that the supply of funds in the bond market
be consistent with lenderssupply decisions.
The equilibrium can be computed by backward induction, starting with
period 2 and then moving to period 1. The key (and the most di¢ cult
step) is to solve simultaneously for the householdsinvestment choices, the
lenderssupply decisions, and the governments default decision. In what
follows I will focus on equilibria in monotone strategies. This greatly sim-
plies the task of solving the model and renders the analysis more tractable.
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2.1 Additional Assumptions
To simplify the analysis and ensure that the government problem is
well-posed, I make the following assumptions (listed below from the least
to the most restrictive).10
Assumption 1 The legacy debt is large enough, B1 > B1 for some thresh-
old B1.
Assumption 1 ensures that if the government decides to repay its legacy
debt, it will nd it optimal to borrow a positive amount. Otherwise, lenders
stop playing any role in the model.
Assumption 2 The wealth of each lenders j is bounded by b (i.e., b < b).
Assumption 2 simply implies that the total liquidity in the bonds market
is nite. This is a typical assumption in the models with risk neutral traders
and incomplete information (see e.g. Albagli et al., 2015).11
Assumption 3 Z > Z, that is, output cost of default is not too large.
Assumption 3 implies that the output cost of default at time t is bounded
from below by (1  Z)Yt. This implies that the governments optimal un-
constrained borrowing, the amount it would like to borrow if it repays the
debt, is monotone in A.
Assumption 4 The litigation costsare large (i.e.,  ! 1).
Assumption 4 implies that the main benet to the government from
defaulting comes from repudiation of the legacy debt, B1, rather than from
defaulting on the new debt, B2, which seem to be the relevant case em-
pirically. This assumption also ensures that the governments incentive to
10For a further discussion of these assumptions see Section E of the Appendix.
11For some parameters, this assumption is also needed to ensure that the di¤erence in
the value of repaying and defaulting is su¢ ciently monotone. See Section A:1:3 of the
Appendix.
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default decreases as the supply of funds in the market increases, and is
essential for establishing existence of equilibrium.12
Given the above assumptions, I now analyze the equilibrium of the
model. I compute the equilibrium using backward induction. Note that
once the government makes its choices of B2, d1, g1, no agent makes any
decision and the equilibrium outcomes are determined. Therefore, I begin
the analysis by describing the governments new borrowing, default, and
spending decisions in period 1.
2.2 Period t = 1: The Governments Decisions
The government decides how much to borrow, whether or not to default,
and how much to spend to maximize the householdsutility, internalizing
how each of these decisions a¤ects consumption, aggregate productivity,
and future tax revenues. The government makes these decisions after ob-
serving householdsinvestment decisions, the supply of funds in the market,
and the average level of productivity in the economy.
Let k2 = fki2gi2[0;1], and let V R1 (A;k2; S) be the value to the govern-
ment of repaying its debt when the average productivity is equal to A, the
householdsinvestment prole is k2, and the supply of funds in the bond
market is S. Then V R1 (A;k2; S) is given by
V R1 (A;k2; S) = max
B22[0;S]
X
t=1;2
Z 1
0
h
log

ci;Rt

+ log
 
gRt
i
di

s:t: gR1 = Y
R
1  B1 +B2
gR2 = Y
R
2   (1 + r)B2,
where gRt is the government spending in period t, Y
R
t is the aggregate
output at time t if the government repays the debt. When the government
decides to repay its debt, it chooses its new borrowing, B2, to maximize
12Note that a high  is needed to ensure that there is a region where the government is
exposed to self-fullling beliefs. For example in Cole and Kehoe (2000)  = 0, and as the
consequence they can only ensure the existence of such a region at extreme parameter
values. A separate issue arises from the fact that in my model lenders and households
have incomplete information. As noted by Kletzer (1984) in debt crises models with
asymmetric information an equilibrium may not exists. Assumption 4 ensures that this
is not an issue.
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householdsutility subject to the available funds in the market, S, and its
budget constraints.
Let V D1 (A;k2; S) be the value associated with defaulting, that is,
V D1 (A;k2; S) = max
B22[0;S]
X
t=1;2
Z 1
0
h
log

ci;Dt

+ log
 
gDt
i
di

s:t: gD1 = 
 
ZY R1

+ (1  )B2
gD2 = 
 
ZY R2

If the governments defaults, it borrows the maximum possible amount in
the market (i.e., B2 = S) and then repudiates all of its debt, and both of
these actions tend to increase government spending in period 1. When  !
1, this e¤ect of borrowing as much as possible vanishes and the main benet
of default is an increase in the g1 due to repudiation of the legacy debt
B1. The negative e¤ect of defaulting is a drop in aggregate productivity
by factor Z.
When deciding whether or not to default, the government compares
V R1 (A;k2; S) with V
D
1 (A;k2; S) and chooses to repay its debt if and only
if the value associated with repaying is larger than the value associated
with defaulting, that is, if and only if
V (A;k2; S)  V R1 (A;k2; S)  V D1 (A;k2; S)  0 (1)
2.3 Default Decisions and the Fragility Region
For su¢ ciently low productivity levels, the government nds it optimal
to default regardless of the households and lenders actions  when A
is low, defaulting leads to an increase in government spending. On the
other hand, when the average level of productivity is high, the government
always nds it optimal to repay the debt. Intuitively, for high A, defaulting
not only leads to a drop in private consumption but also results in less
government spending. Accordingly, for each interest rate r, there exist two
thresholds, A (r) and A (r), such that the government always defaults if
A < A (r) and never defaults if A > A (r).
For all A 2 A (r) ; A (r), the governments default decision depends
on the householdsand lenderschoices. If the lenders expect default, they
invest all their funds in the risk-free asset. In this case, the government
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Figure 3: Fragility Region
cannot roll over its debt, and hence repaying B1 becomes very costly in
terms of the forgone utility from government spending. If, on the other
hand, the households expect default, they decrease their investment, lead-
ing to a drop in the governments revenues (taxes) in the future. This
translates into a drop in government expenditure in both periods (since
the government smooths out the drop in its revenue across time) and leads
to a higher cost of repaying the legacy debt. If A 2 A (r) ; A (r), these
costs are large enough that in response to a shift in householdsor lenders
expectations the government nds it optimal to default. Figure 3 depicts
the fragility region

A (r) ; A (r)

2.4 Households Problem
Consider household i with an idiosyncratic productivity shock Ai that
must choose how much to invest. This households problem can be written
as
max
k2
E
"X
t=1;2
[log (ct) + log (gt)]
Ai;
#
s:t: c1 = (1  )Zd1()eAif (k1)  k2
c2 = (1  )Zd1()eAif (k2)
 = fk2;; r; d1; g1; g2; B2g ;
where  is the strategy prole of all players and the expectations are taken
over the government default decisions, d1 (), as well as over the average
16
level of productivity, A. Household i chooses k2 to maximize its utility sub-
ject to the budget constraint, taking  as given. Lemma 1 characterizes
householdsoptimal investment when households believe that the govern-
ment will always default if the average productivity is less than A (i.e.,
that the government follows a monotone default strategy with threshold
A).
Lemma 1 Suppose that the government defaults if and only if A < A.
Then household is optimal investment is given by
k2 = (1  ) eAif (k1)  (Ai; "; A) ,
where  (Ai; "; A) is increasing in the idiosyncratic productivity, Ai, and
decreasing in the default threshold, A.13
2.5 Lenders Problem
Simultaneously with the households investment choices, the lenders
must decide whether to supply their funds to the bond market or to invest
their funds in storage. Lenders base their decisions on the prior belief about
A and their private signals, xj. Let R () be the government repayment
set for a xed strategy prole . Then the expected payo¤ to lender j from
supplying the funds to the bond market is given byZ
A2R()
 
1 + rmin
(
1;
BR;u2 (A;)
S (A;)
)!
f (Ajxj) dA,
where f (Ajxj) is lender js posterior belief about A, BR;u2 (A;) is the
unconstrained desired borrowing by the government in repayment, and
S (A;) is the supply function implied by the lenders supply strategy
prole . Finally, min
n
1; BR;u2 (A;) =S (A;)
o
is the amount that lender
j expects to lend to the government given that the average productivity
level is A.14 Lender j supplies his funds to the bond market if and only if
the expected return from supplying the funds is higher than 1, the return
from investing in storage. The next lemma characterizes Lendersbehavior.
13See Section A of the Appendix for the exact denition of  (Ai; ";A).
14For all A =2 R (), the government borrows all available funds in the market and
then defaults, implying that in this case lender j earns nothing. If A 2 R (), the
government would like to borrow BR;u2 .
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Lemma 2 Suppose that the government defaults if and only if A < A.
Then an optimal strategy for each lender j is to supply the funds to the
bond market if and only if he receives a signal xj  x. Moreover, x is the
unique solution to the equation
1Z
A
 
1 + rmin
(
1;
BR;u2 (A;)
S (A;x)
)!
f (Ajx) dA = 1,
where S (A;x) is the supply function when all lenders follow this strategy.
2.6 Equilibrium Default Threshold
Above I characterized the optimal behavior of each type of agent. This,
in turn, allows me to prove the following proposition, which states that for
any interest rate r there exists a unique equilibrium in monotone strategies.
Proposition 1 There exist " > 0 and x > 0 such that for any inter-
est rate r, any " 2 (0; "], and any x 2 (0; x], the model has a unique
equilibrium in monotone strategies where the following hold:
1. The government defaults if and only if A < A (r).15
2. Each lender provides the funds if and only if xj  x (r).
3. Householdsinvestment rules, k2, are increasing in Ai.
The proof of Proposition 1 builds on the insights and results of Athey
(1996) and Morris and Shin (2003). The above result is non-trivial for
several reasons. First, di¢ culty comes from the fact that in the model,
the global game is played by three di¤erent types of agents, each with
its own preferences and choice sets. Second, the lenderspayo¤ function
satises only a weak single-crossing condition, rather than global strategic
complementarities, as in typical global games.16 Finally, the regime-change
15The default threshold A (r) depends also on all the parameters of the model such as
the tax rate  , the capital stock k1, the legacy debt B1, etc. For notational convenience,
I suppress this dependence whenever this does not lead to a confusion.
16Applying global games results in a complex environment in which payo¤ functions
satisfy only the weak single-crossing condition, rather than global strategic complemen-
tarities, is not without cost. In particular, I need to restrict my attention to monotone
strategies. Morris and Shin (2003) discuss why, in general, the single-crossing condition
is not enough to prove uniqueness without such a restriction.
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condition (i.e., the condition that determines whether default will occur)
arises endogenously from the governments optimal behavior  unlike in
the typical global games literature, where it is exogenously imposed.
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Figure 4: Default Threshold
Figure 3 depicts the equilibrium default threshold A as a function of
the interest rate r. We see that A (r) is a non-monotone function of r. To
understand this, note that when the interest rate is low, few lenders supply
their funds to the bond market. As a result, the government nds it opti-
mal to default for most productivity values in the fragility region.As r
increases, the supply of funds increases since higher r compensates lenders
for exposing themselves to default risk. At the same time, households
investment rules shift upwards since they anticipate that the government
will choose to repay the debt for a larger set of productivity levels. This
decreases the governments incentives to default and leads to a lower A (r).
A higher interest rate, however, increases the costs of rolling over the debt,
discouraging the government from smoothing debt repayment over time.
This tends to decrease the value of repaying debt to the government. For
su¢ ciently high r, this negative e¤ect dominates, implying that A (r) be-
comes an increasing function of r.
It is important to stress that, while the default threshold is unique, the
outcome of the model in the fragility region is driven fully by households
and lendersexpectations. For all productivity levels in the fragility region,
both repayment and default could be supported as equilibrium outcomes
if we had the freedom to choose the lendersand householdsexpectations.
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However, the householdsand lendersexpectations are not free objects.
An incomplete-information structure transforms beliefs into equilibrium
objects and requires them to be sequentially rational and consistent with
agentsstrategy proles. This imposes requirements on the beliefs that are
not present in the complete-information game.
2.7 Optimal Choice of r
It remains to characterize the governments optimal choice of interest
rate, r. The government chooses the interest rate based on the current and
past fundamentals of the economy, fB1; k1; A 1g. The government also
knows its future policy functions fd1; g1; g2; B2g and realizes that it can
a¤ect consumption, investment, and the supply of funds through its choice
of interest rate. To choose the optimal interest rate, the government solves
the following problem:
W (A 1; B1;k1;) = max
r
E
"X
t=1;2
Z 1
i=0

log
 
cit

+ log (gt)

di
A 1
#
s:t: optimal policy functions fc1; c2; d1; B2; g1; g2g
optimal lendersand householdsstrategies f;k2g .
When choosing the interest rate, the government faces the following trade-
o¤: On the one hand, at least initially, a higher r tends to decrease the
default threshold. On the other hand, a higher r increases the cost of
borrowing at t = 1, making it more costly to roll over the maturing debt.
Thus, the government weighs the positive e¤ect of a lower default threshold
against the increase in the borrowing costs. The above trade-o¤implies that
the government will always set an interest rate on the decreasing portion
of the A (r)-curve.
3 Preventing Self-fullling Debt Crises
Having characterized the equilibrium of the model, I now focus on the
main questions that motivated this paper: (1) how the government can
decrease the ex-ante probability of default (i.e., prevent a debt crisis), and
(2) what role endogenous expectations play in determining the e¤ect of
government policies on the probability of crises.
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I start by considering a case where each policy change is announced
in period 1 before the households and lenders make their decisions but
after r is set, and that the government is committed to implementing the
announced policies. The policy itself is, however, is not implemented until
the end of that period. These assumptions are made for simplicity and
allow me to focus on the fundamental forces at play in the model while
abstracting away from the e¤ects of other factors. I relax these assumptions
in the following sections. In Section 4, I analyze what happens if either the
policy adjustment is unexpected or if there is uncertainty as to whether
the government will implement the announced policy, while in Section F
of the Appendix I analyze the case when the policy announcement is made
before the interest rate is set. Figure 5 depicts the timing for the policy
adjustment considered in this section.
Choice of r Lenders' &
households
decisions
The governments' 
      decisions
      Policy
Announcement
      Policy
Implementation
t=2t=1
Figure 5: Timing of Policy Adjustments
In order to simplify analysis and make the problem more tractable, I
make the following assumption:
Assumption 5 B1 is large enough so that for all A > A (0) the govern-
ments desired borrowing in repayment exceeds the supply of funds in the
market.17
Assumption 5 simplies the problem by eliminating the issue of com-
petition between lenders in the bond market, in which case the lenders
problem can be solved in closed form.18
17Recall from Section 2:3 that A (0) is the lower bound for the fragility region when
r = 0. Thus, it is the productivity level below which the government will always default,
regardless of the interest rate and regardless of the householdsand lendersdecisions.
18While Assumption 5 simplies the comparative statics analysis, it does not a¤ect
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3.1 Equilibrium E¤ects of Policy Adjustments19
Before analyzing specic policies, it is useful to understand the equilib-
rium forces that are at play when the government adjusts its policy. For
this purpose, consider an abstract policy adjustment, captured by a change
in a parameter  .20 We would like to understand how a change in  a¤ects
the ex-ante probability of default which, for a given interest rate r, is given
by Pr (A < A). This preliminary abstract analysis has additional advan-
tages: (1) It highlights how dispersed beliefs and endogenous expectations
a¤ect the of government policies, and (2) is helps to understand how and
when predictions of the model with dispersed beliefs will di¤er from the
predictions of the models where defaults are driven only by fundamentals.
Let A denote households and lenders belief regarding the default
threshold (where in equilibrium we have A = A as agentsbeliefs have
to be correct). We have the following Proposition.
Proposition 2 The change in default threshold implied by the adjustment
in a policy parameter  is given by
dA
d 
=
1
1  @A
@x
@x
@A  
R 1
0
@A
@ki2
@ki2
@Adi| {z }
Multiplier e¤ ect (M)


@A
@ 
+
@A
@x
@x
@ 
+
Z 1
0
@A
@ki2
@ki2
@ 
di

| {z }
Direct e¤ ect (D)
(2)
The multiplier e¤ect is always strictly greater than 1 so that sgn (dA=d ) =
sgn (D).
The above Proposition establishes that the e¤ect of an adjustment in
any parameter  on A can be decomposed into the direct e¤ect and the
multiplier e¤ect. To understand the intuition behind Equation (2) consider
a change in  , but keep rst householdsand lendersbeliefs about A con-
stant. Then a change in  a¤ects the governments incentive to default,
its underlying logic. In particular, Proposition 2 holds in the same form regardless of
whether we impose Assumption 5. For a more detailed discussion of the consequences
of this assumption see Section E of the Appendix.
19For comparison of predictions based on the baseline model and its version where
crises are driven purely by fundamentals see Section C of the Appendix.
20For concreteness, one can think of this policy as an increase in taxes, in which case
 =  .
22
by changing the di¤erence between the values of repaying and defaulting
on the debt. This e¤ect works through the governments indi¤erence con-
dition; I denote it by @A=@ , since it corresponds to the partial e¤ect
of a change in policy keeping strategies of households and lenders xed.
Moreover, the policy change potentially a¤ects households and lenders
decision problems, thereby leading households and lenders to adjust their
strategies and in turn bringing about a further change in the governments
incentive to default (these e¤ects are captured by terms @A

@k2
@k2
@ 
and @A

@x
@x
@ 
,
respectively). Thus, the direct e¤ectis equal to the change in the default
threshold, keeping householdsand lendersexpectations xed.
The householdsand lendersexpectations, however, are not xed. In
response to this initial change in the default threshold, the households and
lenders adjust their expectations, and thus their strategies, which leads
to a further change in A, inducing another round of adjustment in the
householdsand lendersexpectations and so on. Thus, multiplier e¤ect
capture the change in default threshold driven by the adjustment in house-
holdsand lendersexpectations.
Proposition 2 leads to three important implications. First, whether a
change in a government policy increases or decreases the probability of
default is determined by the direct e¤ect.Thus, to establish whether a
given policy decreases or increases the likelihood of a debt crisis one can
focus on understanding how the policy a¤ects the government incentive to
default holding agentsbeliefs. Second, adjustments in endogenous expec-
tations always amplify the initial impact of any policy adjustments, and
thus are key for quantifying the impact that any policy has on the probabil-
ity of default (see Section 5 for the analysis when this e¤ect is particularly
strong). Third, the presence of dispersed beliefs a¤ects the qualitative pre-
dictions of the model: Even though the direct e¤ect captures intuitive
forces that are present in standard models, these forces are distorted by the
presence of dispersed information. Intuitively, the direct e¤ect of a given
policy depends on the agentsbehavior without the policy change as well
as their response to a change in a policy, both of which are distorted by
the presence of dispersed information (see Section C of the Appendix).
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3.2 Overview of Policies
Using the above insights, I now analyze two policy measures that re-
ceived a lot of attention in policy debates during the recent sovereign debt
crisis in Europe: (1) austerity (increase in taxes) and (2) a scal stimulus
(nanced with debt). The European debt crisis generated a lively debate
about viability of the above policies for preventing debt crises (see Brun-
nermeier et al. (2016)). Below, I describe how each of these policies is
introduced into the model.
Increase in TaxesIn the model, a rise in the tax rate is captured by an
increase in  , the fraction of output that the government takes away from
households. Below I consider the case where once adjusted,  is kept con-
stant across periods and is the same regardless of whether the government
defaults. This ts a scenario where the government nds it di¢ cult to
change tax laws once they have been enacted (for example because of the
lengthy political process it involves). In Section C of the Appendix, I con-
sider the situation where higher  is implemented only if the government
repays the debt, a case that is relevant in the situation where policymak-
ers are willing to increase taxes only to avoid default and once the default
occurs they are likely to abandon this idea. The results are similar for the
both cases.
Fiscal StimulusI model scal stimulus as an increase in the initial capital
stock of each household from k1 to (1 + s) k1 nanced by the government,
where s measures the size of the stimulus as a percentage of the initial
capital stock. Thus, if the government decides to engage in a stimulus
the total output of the economy will increase.21 I do not explicitly model
21This is a simple way to model a scal stimulus in the current framework. One should
interpret the increase in k1 not as an increase in physical capital owned by households but
rather as an increase in government spending on public goods and services that enhance
production (e.g., an increase in expenditure on infrastructure or on the maintenance
of the rule of law). An alternative way to model stimulus would be to explicitly allow
government spending to enter the production function, that is to write the household
production function as yit = e
Aif
 
kit; ht

where ht captures explicitly the government
expenditure that is important for production. However, the qualitative conclusions
would remain unchanged.
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the governments nancing decision. Instead, I assume that to nance a
stimulus, the government issues additional debt at the end of the period
preceding period 1. I consider separately the case where this additional debt
matures at the end of period 1 together with B1 (short-term debt nancing
with interest rate rST  0) or in period 2 (long-term debt nancing with
interest rate rLT  0).
3.3 Increase in Taxes
As explained above, to understand the e¤ect of an increase in the tax
rate  on the default threshold, it is enough to focus on its direct e¤ects.
A higher tax rate leads to a change in the governments incentives to repay
debt equal to
Y R1
 
uRg1   uDg1

+ Y R2
 
uRg2   uDg2
| {z }
Concavity e¤ect
+ Y R1 (1  Z)uDg1 + Y R2 (1  Z)uDg2| {z }
Di¤erential increase in tax revenues
  
1   Y
R
2
 
uRg2   ZuDg2

| {z }
Investment distortion
; (3)
where uRgt and u
D
gt are the marginal utilities from government spending in
period t in repayment and default, respectively, and is Y Rt the total output
of the economy in period t in repayment, all evaluated at the threshold pro-
ductivity level A. If the expression in (3) is positive, then the governments
incentive to repay its debt increases following an increase in  .22
The expression in (3) tells us that an increase in the tax rate a¤ects the
governments default incentives through three channels. First, a higher 
implies higher tax revenues. Since at A the governments spending is lower
in repayment than in default, the concavity of the utility function implies
that a given increase in government spending leads to a greater increase
in the value of repaying than in the value of defaulting, thus decreasing
the governments default incentive (the concavity e¤ect). Second, since
the total output is higher in repayment, a given increase in the tax rate
22The expression in (3) corresponds to @@V (A
; k2; x; ). The direct e¤ect is
equal to @@V (A
; k2; x; ) divided by   @@A V (A; k2; x; ) < 0. In particular,
the sum of the concavity e¤ect and the di¤erential increase in tax revenues divided by
  @@A V (A; k2; x; ) is equal to @A

@ , while the expression for investment distortion
divided by   @@A V (A; k2; x; ) corresponds to @A

@k2
@k2
@ in Equation (2).
25
translates into a greater increase in tax revenues in repayment than in
default, further decreasing the governments default incentives (the dif-
ferential increase in tax revenues). The last term captures the negative
e¤ect of higher taxes on householdsinvestment decisions, where = (1  )
is the rate at which output decreases with higher taxes and uRg2 ZuDg2 mea-
sures how painfulthis decrease in spending is to households in repayment
compared to default (the investment distortion).
Proposition 3 There exists  > 0 such that for all    an increase in
taxes decrease the probability of default. Moreover, if x ! 0 and rb < B1
then  > 1= (1 + ).
The above proposition states that if the initial tax rate is not too high
(i.e.,   ) then an increase in the tax rate will decrease the probability
of default. This result follows from the observation that the investment
distortion= (1  ) is a convex function of  and for high values of  it
dominates the positive e¤ect of higher tax revenues. The second part of
Proposition 3 states that if the supply of funds in the bond market (which,
when lenders have precise information, is bounded from above by rb) is
lower than B1 then an increase in  decreases the default threshold for all
  1= (1 + ). In other words, if the government is unable to roll over all
of its debt then an increase in taxes necessarily decreases the probability
of default for all   1= (1 + ).
How likely is this last condition satised in reality? Note that in the
model  can be interpreted as the capital share of output, and thus  
0:33. The average ratio of government tax revenues to GDP in Eurozone in
2011 was according to Eurostat about 0:4 (translating into   0:4 in the
model) which implies that the su¢ cient conditions for austerity to decrease
the probability of default during the recent European debt crisis were likely
satised.
The next result further strengthens the case for austerity. It shows that
when the initial expectations about the current economic situations (as
captured by A 1) are low then an increase in the tax rate will decrease the
probability of default even if  is already very high.
Corollary 1 For any  2 (0; 1) there exists A 1 () such that if A 1 <
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A 1 () then dA
=d < 0.23
While this result might seem surprising at rst, it is rather intuitive:
When A 1 is low then lenders are unwilling the supply the funds to bond
market unless they receive very high signals, which implies that the total
amount of funds available in the bond market is low. As the consequence,
for low enoughA 1 the government is able to borrow very little and the only
way it can repay the debt and avoid default is by increasing its revenues.
An increase in  is one way to achieve this.
3.4 Fiscal Stimulus
Now consider the e¤ect of a scal stimulus on the probability of default.
A scal stimulus leads to a change in governments incentives to repay debt
equal to

@Y R1
@s
 
uRg1   uDg1

+ 
@Y R2
@s
 
uRg2   uDg2

| {z }
Concavity e¤ect
+

@Y R1
@s
uDg1 +
@Y R2
@s
uDg2

 (1  Z)| {z }
Di¤erential increase in tax revenues
 uRgt
 
1 + rstim

k1| {z } ,
Increase in debt
(4)
where rstim 2 rST ; rLT	 is the interest rate on the debt issued to nance
the stimulus, @Y Rt =@s is the increase in output in period t resulting from
the stimulus, and where uRgt , u
D
gt and Y
R
t are dened as in Section 3:3.
The expression in (4) tells us that a scal stimulus a¤ects the govern-
ments default incentive through three channels: (1) the concavity e¤ect;
(2) a di¤erential increase in government tax revenues in repayment and
default (both of which were also present in the case of a tax increase); and
(3) a negative e¤ect due to an increase in the governments debt burden
(equal to uRg1
 
1 + rST

k1 if the stimulus is nanced with short-term debt,
or to uRg2
 
1 + rLT

k1 if nanced with long-term debt).
Proposition 4 Consider a stimulus nanced with short-term debt. There
exists B1 such that stimulus decreases probability of debt crisis if and only
if B1 > B1. Moreover, B1=k1 >(1+rST ) 1 .
23Recall that A 1 denotes the past level of productivity and is equal to the mean of
agentsprior belief.
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Proposition 4 establishes that stimulus decreases the probability of de-
fault if and only if the debt to capital stock ratio is high. The intuition
behind this observation is simple: A higher B1 implies a higher marginal
benet from an increase in output in repayment while a higher k1 implies a
higher cost of increasing capital stock by a given percentage. Proposition
4 provides also a necessary condition for the stimulus to work: The ratio
of debt to capital has to be larger than 1

.
It is important to stress the even though the above proposition identies
conditions under which scal stimulus nanced with short term debt can
work, these conditions are unlikely to hold in practice. Since  can be
interpreted as the capital share of output so that   0:33, the above
proposition suggests that in order for a scal stimulus nanced with short-
term debt to work one needs capital to debt ratio in excess of 3. This is
unlikely to be the case for most countries. For example, this ratio is less
than 1 for Eurozone countries suggests that stimulus was not a valid option
for the governments during the recent European debt crisis.24
When a stimulus is nanced with long term debt the necessary condition
for the stimulus to work becomes B1=k1 >(1+rLT ) 1(uRg1=uRg2). Since u
R
g1
=uRg2 <
1,25 as long as rLT is not signicantly higher than rST , the condition under
which scal stimulus nanced with long-term to decrease the probability of
default is less stringent compared to the one in the case of short-term debt
nancing. However, given the discussion, even this condition is unlikely
to hold since it would require an implausible large drop in government
spending in period 1 compared to period 2.26
4 Economic Policy Uncertainty and Its Consequences
Above I considered a situation where a policy change was expected by
both households and lenders. In this section, I investigate how the above
24The capital-output ratio for most Eurozone countries is above 3 (see Penn World
Tables, Feenstra et al. (2015)) while the debt-to-GDP ratio is smaller than 2.
25In equilibrium the government expenditure in period 1 is always lower than in period
2 in repayment as the government is unable to smooth debt repayment over time.
26Given that for most countries 1  3 and B1=k1  1 we would need the government
spending in period 2 to be three times higher than in period 1 in order for this condition
to be satised.
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results change if the households and lenders are uncertain as to whether
the government will adjust its policies. The analysis is motivated by the
observation that often there is a strong disagreement among policymakers
regarding the political and economic desirability of given economic poli-
cies, thereby giving rise to a substantial policy uncertainty. Indeed, as
discussed in the introduction (Figure 1) there was a large spike in such an
uncertainty during the European debt crisis.27 Thus, it is important to un-
derstand if and how such uncertainty distorts the e¤ectiveness of austerity
and stimulus.
I consider two cases. First, I investigate the models predictions when a
policy change is unexpected by lenders and households. This case describes
a situation where either government announcements have no credibility (so
that agents do not believe there will be any policy change), or when the
government decides to do an unexpected U-turn on its economic policy.
Second, I analyze a situation where households and lenders expect that the
government will adjust its policy with probability p 2 (0; 1). Otherwise,
there are no changes compared to Section 3.
4.1 Unexpected Policy Adjustment
Proposition 5 Suppose that a policy change is unexpected. Then
dA
d 
=
@A
@ 
.
Moreover, dA=d ! 0 as "; x ! 0.
Proposition 5 tells us that when a policy change is unexpected the
change in the default threshold is equal to the direct e¤ect the policy has
on the governments incentives to default. Since agents expect no policy
adjustment, their strategies are unchanged, implying that the multiplier
27Policy uncertainty played an important role in Greece, where after winning the
unexpected early elections in January 2015 the Syriza-led coalition stopped implemen-
tation of reforms, only to suddenly change its mind six months later, but not until after
pushing Greece to the verge of default. This issue also played an important role in Italy.
In response to the crisis, the Italian parliament formed a technocratic government, with
Mario Monti as prime minister, to implement a package of structural reforms. Lack-
ing political support the government was less successful than expected in passing the
reforms.
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e¤ect and the part of the direct e¤ect that operates through households
and lenderschoices are absent. Moreover, in the limit an unexpected policy
change becomes completely ine¤ective as the direct e¤ect converges to 0.28
This last result provides a strong warning against unexpected policy
U-turns so that agents are not surprised by the government actions. It also
worth emphasizing that the same logic applies to policy announcements
that are viewed by agents as not credible, and hence governments should
strive to communicate its policy plans not only in advance but also in a
credible manner.
Corollary 2 Suppose that a policy change is unexpected and that "; x > 0.
1. An increase in the tax rate  always decreases the governments in-
centives to default.
2. A scal stimulus nanced with short-term debt decreases the govern-
ments incentives to default if and only if
&unexpST =
 (B1  B2)
Y1  B1 +B2  
 
1 + rST

k1
Y1  B1 +B2 > 0
while in case of the long-term debt nancing the relevant condition is
&unexpLT >
 (B1  B2)
Y1  B1 +B2  
 
1 + rLT

k1
Y2   (1 + r)B2 > 0
The above corollary implies that, as long as "; x > 0, an unexpected
increase in tax rate always leads to decrease in the probability of default.
This is because the negative e¤ect of higher taxes on householdsinvestment
choices is now absent (no investment distortion). On the other hand, a scal
stimulus, if unexpected, leads only to an expansion of output in period 1;
28To understand this consider lender j who can observe A. Lender j would lend
to the government if and only if A > A, where A corresponds to householdsand
lendersbeliefs about default threshold. Thus, lender j will not respond to any policy
change unless it also leads to a change in A, that is it leads to a change in beliefs of
other agents. But since a policy change in unexpected agentsbeliefs are xed and A
is unchanged implying that lender j does not adjust his behavior following the policy
change. While in the model lenders cannot observe true A, as x ! 0 the uncertainty
about A disappears and we converge to the case described above. Similar logic applies
to the behavior of households.
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households keep their investment strategies constant as they do not expect
any change in the economy. As a consequence, a scal stimulus is now more
likely increase the probability of default than before. It follows that if the
government lacks credibility or if it suddenly decides to act, austerity is a
better option than stimulus. However, it should be kept in mind that, in
light of Proposition 5, the overall e¤ect of these policies on the probability
of default will be rather small, especially when householdsand lenders
private information is precise.
4.2 Uncertainty about Reforms
In this section I consider a case where agents expect the government
to implement a given reform with probability p 2 (0; 1). Let dA=d (p)
denote the total change in the default threshold when the agents expect
the policy to be implemented with probability p and the government does
implement the announced policy. It can be shown that in this case we
have:29
dA
d 
(p) = p
dA
d 
(1) + (1  p) @A

@ 
(5)
Thus, a change in the default threshold is a weighted average of the change
in the default threshold when there is no uncertainty (dA=d (1)) and
when the policy change is unexpected (@A=@ ). Intuitively, when agents
expect that the policy will be implemented with probability p, their re-
sponse to the prospect of the policy adjustment is proportionately less
than in the case of no economic policy uncertainty. This results in an ad-
justment of the default threshold equal to pdA

d 
(1). On the other hand,
with probability 1   p households and lenders do not expect the adjust-
ment, in which case if the policy adjustment happens it is driven by the
direct change in the governments default incentive (and hence the adjust-
ment in A is equal to the change in the default threshold when the policy
adjustment is unexpected).
29For more details behind derivations of Equation 5 see Section D of the Appendix.
It is worth stressing that derivations of this decompositions are non-trivial and that the
fact that such a linear decomposition holds for the default threshold is surprising as the
model itself is highly non-linear.
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Proposition 6 Suppose that agents attach probability p 2 (0; 1) to the
announced policy being implemented.
1. Then an increase in  decreases probability of default for a wider
range of initial conditions than in the case of no uncertainty (p = 1),
that is
dA
d
(1) < 0 =) dA

d
(p) < 0 but not vice verse
2. Then a scal stimulus decreases probability of default for a more lim-
ited range of initial conditions than in the case of no uncertainty
(p = 1), that is
dA
ds
(p) < 0 =) dA

ds
(p) < 0 but not vice verse
3. If " and x are small then
dAd (p) < dAd (1)
Proposition 6 shows that the conclusion obtained in the case of unex-
pected policy changes extend to the case when policies are implemented
with positive probability. In particular, Part 1 establishes that in the
presence of uncertainty as to whether the government will implement an-
nounced policies an increase in taxes is an e¤ective way to decrease the
likelihood of a crisis for a wider range of initial conditions. The intuition
behind this result is the same as before: Uncertain as to whether higher
taxes will be implemented households do not decrease their investment as
much as they would otherwise. Similarly, Part 2 establishes that in the
presence of such an uncertainty the range of conditions under which scal
stimulus decrease the likelihood of a crisis shrinks. Thus, the presence of
policy uncertainty strengthens the appeal of austerity compared to stimu-
lus. However, as shown in Part 3, in both cases economic policy uncertainty
decreases the overall e¤ect both policies have on the default threshold.
Thus, Proposition 6 leads to two conclusions. First, economic policy
uncertainty is undesirable as it decreases the overall e¤ectiveness of gov-
ernment policies. Second, in the presence of economic policy uncertainty
austerity becomes relatively more preferred option compared to stimulus.
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5 Numerical Analysis and The Role of the Multiplier E¤ect
Above I analyzed analytically how scal stimulus and increase in taxes
a¤ect the government incentives to default and how these e¤ects depends
on the degree of economic policy uncertainty. In this section I complement
the above analytical results with numerical a investigation. In particu-
lar, I investigate numerically: (1) whether for reasonable parameter values
the government policies considered above tend to decrease or increase the
probability of default, and (2) when is the e¤ect of expectations particularly
important (i.e., when is the multiplier e¤ect large).
5.1 The Multiplier E¤ect and the Role of Beliefs
Since the multiplier e¤ect captures the role of beliefs, we should expect
that the multiplier e¤ect plays an important role if changes in households
and lendersbeliefs have a relatively strong impact on the value to the gov-
ernment of repaying its debt and defaulting on its debt. Below, I argue that
householdsand lendersbeliefs have a strong impact on the governments
decisions when households tend to invest a high fraction of their income
and the government desired borrowing is high.
Households expectations are important if the di¤erence between an
investment of a pessimistic household and an optimistic household (holding
productivity level constant) is large since then an adjustment in households
expectations will lead to a large change in the total output, and hence in
tax revenues. Since this di¤erence is equal to
kR2   kD2 = (1  Z) (1  ) eAik1

1 + 
one should expect that householdsbeliefs play an important role when
kR2   kD2 is large, which is the case when  , Z are low and , k1 are high.
Lendersbeliefs a¤ect the government default decision by determining
how much the government can borrow. However, if the governments de-
sired borrowing is low then the quantity of funds supplied to the market
matters relatively little since the government would not want to borrow
much anyway. Therefore, one should expect that the role of lendersexpec-
tations is large when the governments desired borrowing is high. From the
governments problem it follows that the governments desired borrowing
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is equal to
BR;u2 (A) =
(1 + r)B1 + Y
R
2 (A)  (1 + r) Y R1 (A)
2 (1 + r)
where Y Rt (A) is the aggregate output at time t if the government repays its
debt when the average productivity is A. The desired borrowing tends to
be high when  is low (a high  decreases investment, and hence decreases
Y2), k1 is low and  is high (since then Y2 is relatively high compared to
Y1) or B1 is high.
5.2 Numerical Analysis
The next goal is to understand: (1) whether for reasonable parameter
choice an increase in tax and scal stimulus tend to decrease or increase
the probability of default, and (2) how important is the multiplier e¤ect in
driving these results.
I choose a reference set of parameters in a way that the model resembles
the GIIPS economies (i.e., Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain) at
the onset of the European debt crisis in 2008. I then vary key parameters
from this reference point, one at a time, to see how the e¤ectiveness of the
government policies and the importance of the multiplier e¤ect varies with
the parameters.30 To make results comparable across di¤erent parameter
values, following each change in a parameter of the model, I adjust the
mean of the prior belief so that the ex-ante probability of default, before
30From the perspective of the analysis, the most important parameters are  , the
tax rate; Z, the output costs of default; k1, the initial the capital stock; and , the
capital share of output, since these parameters determine directly the costs and benets
of both policies considered above. I set  = 0:4, the average ratio of governments
tax revenue to GDP in the Eurozone in 2011 as reported by Eurostat, and Z = 0:92,
implying that in the case of a debt crisis, output declines by 8% (the observed output
decline in Greece after it defaulted in 2010). I choose k1 = 1:31 to match the average
growth of the net capital stock of 2% in the GIIPS economies in the run-up to the crisis
(period 2004-2008), and  = 0:4 (see Arpaia et al. (2009)). The information parameters
are x = 1=20, " =
p
3x, and  = 1=12. Mean of prior, A 1, is set to imply a 10%
probability of default. The initial debt is B1 = 1, and the total wealth of the lenders is
four times the maturing debt, implying the ratio b=B1 = 4, which is twice the average
bid-to-cover ratio in the debt auctions in Germany and Italy as reported in Beetsma
et al. (2013).
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a new policy is implemented, is equal to 10%. For space considerations, I
report below only results where I vary the tax rate  and the initial level of
capital k1. Additional results can be found in Section G of the Appendix.
(a) The change in the probability of default
as the initial  varies.
(b) The contiburion of the multiplier e¤ect as
the initial  varies.
(c) The change in the probability of default
as the initial k1 varies.
(d) The contiburion of the multiplier e¤ect as
the initial k1 varies.
Figure 6: The e¤ect of a 1% increase in the tax rate.
Increase in the tax rate I consider rst the e¤ect of a 1% increase in
taxes for di¤erent initial values of the tax rate  and the capital stock
k1. Panel A of Figure 6 shows how the e¤ect of this policy varies with
the initial tax level while Panel B depicts how much of the change in the
default threshold is driven by the multiplier e¤ect. We see that an increase
in the tax rate has a larger positive e¤ect when initially taxes are low.
This is because at low  the distortive e¤ect of a tax increase is small while
the multiplier e¤ect is large. Panel B shows that the relative importance
of the multiplier e¤ect decreases as  increases: When the initial tax rate
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is low then the majority of the adjustment in the default threshold A is
driven by the adjustment in householdsand lendersbeliefs, but as initial
 increases the importance of beliefs decreases. This is in line with the
intuition provided in Section 5.1.
Panels C and D of Figure 6 depict the corresponding results of a 1%
increase in the tax rate  for di¤erent values of k1. We see that varying
the initial level of capital has relatively little e¤ect on the e¢ cacy of an
increase in taxes. However, we see that the initial level of capital stock
does a¤ect the importance of the multiplier e¤ect with multiplier e¤ect
being stronger for low values of k1. To understand why this is the case
note that, as explained in Section 5.1, as k1 increases the importance of the
householdsbeliefs tends to increase while the importance of the lenders
beliefs tends to decrease. For the parameters considered here the latter
e¤ect dominates (as the di¤erence between kR2 and k
D
2 is relatively small)
and the importance of the multiplier e¤ect declines as k1 increases.
Fiscal Stimulus Next, I report the e¤ects of a scal stimulus for di¤erent
values of the initial tax rate  and capital stock k1. I consider a scal
stimulus wit size equal to 1% of the initial capital stock and nanced with
short-term debt (with rST = 0).31 Panels A and C of Figure 7 show that
engaging in scal stimulus when a crisis is likely is not a good idea as scal
stimulus tend to increase the probability of default. Moreover, we see that
this negative e¤ect is stronger when initial tax rate is high (since at higher
 households invest less leading to a lower positive e¤ect of stimulus on the
future output) and when k1 is high (since then the marginal value of extra
unit of capital is low while the cost of such a policy is high). Moving our
attention to Panels B and D we observe that, as in the case of an increase
in  , the multiplier e¤ect is an important driver of the adjustment in the
probability of default when k1 or  are relatively low and its role diminishes
as k1 and  increase.
Summary The above results indicate that an increase in the tax rate is
an e¤ective policy for decreasing probability of default for a wide range
of parameters while the opposite is true for a scal stimulus. They also
31The results for a scal stimulus nanced with long-term debt are similar.
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(a) The change in the probability of default
as the initial  varies.
(b) The contiburion of the multiplier e¤ect as
the initial  varies.
(c) The change in the probability of default
as the initial k1 varies.
(d) The contiburion of the multiplier e¤ect as
the initial k1 varies.
Figure 7: The e¤ect of a 1% stimulus.
support the intuition provided above that endogenous adjustments in ex-
pectations play an important role in determining the total change in the
default threshold A.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, I investigated how a government can prevent a self-
fullling debt crisis. To answer this question I developed a model of self-
fullling sovereign default with endogenous expectations and dispersed in-
formation. I then used this model to how scal policies, such as an increase
in taxes or scal stimulus, a¤ect the probability of a crisis and how these
e¤ects are perturbed by the presence of endogenous expectations and dis-
persed beliefs. I showed that typically austerity policies tend to decrease
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the probability of default while scal stimulus tends to increase the proba-
bility of default. I also found that endogenous expectations tend to amplify
the e¤ects of these policies. Finally, I studied how uncertainty about gov-
ernment economic policies changes the e¤ect of government policies and
found that such uncertainty further makes an increase in taxes more at-
tractive options than scal stimulus, but in general it decreases the total
impact those policies have on the economy.
The ndings of this paper contribute to the debate whether the govern-
ment that faces a looming debt crisis should engage in austerity or scal
stimulus that took place during European debt crisis, and provide support
for the choice of austerity. My results suggest that the austerity is partic-
ularly preferable to scal stimulus in an environment where there is high
uncertainty about future economic policies, as often is the case during debt
crises. Thus, the results provide support for the policies adopted during
European debt crises while suggesting that they would have been substan-
tially more e¤ective in the absence of policy uncertainty that accompanied
their implementation.
A few words of caution are needed regarding the interpretation of the
results. First, the paper abstracts from analyzing interactions between ac-
tions of an international lender of last resort (such as ECB) and domestic
government policies. While important, such a question is beyond the scope
of the current paper. Second, in this paper I analyzed a situation when the
government nds itself at a spot where a debt crisis is looming. Indeed,
the main question this paper addresses is how to avoid a debt crisis when
such crisis is likely in the near future. For that purposes, that fact that the
model presented above is two-period is a minor issue. However, the fact
that the model is not dynamic becomes key when trying to answer ques-
tions regarding medium-term policies. A question of particular importance
is what should the government do to avoid facing another debt crisis in
the future once the debt crisis has been averted today. This remains an
important question for the future research.
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Preventing Self-fullling Debt Crises:
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Michal Szkup
University of British Columbia
This appendix contains the proofs of the results that have been stated in the paper and is divided
into six sections. In Section A I solve the main model. This section contains the proofs of Lemma
1 and Lemma 2, and the main uniqueness result (Proposition 1). Section B contains derivations of
the direct and multiplier e¤ects and the proofs of Propositions 2 to 4 and Corollary 1 from the paper.
Section C includes additional results that have been omitted from the paper but may be of interest
to a reader. In particular, it includes a comparison between predictions based on the baseline model
and its version where crises are driven purely by poor fundamentals and the analysis of an increase in
 when it is implemented only in repayment. Section D contains brief derivations of the total change
in the default threshold when the agents expect the policy to be implemented with probability p, i.e.,
dA/d (p), as well as proofs of Propositions 5 and 6, and Corollary 2. In Section E I briey discuss
how the results would change if Assumption 5 was not imposed. Section F contains a discussion of the
e¤ect of an adjustment in the interest rate on the e¤ects of policy changes while Section G contains
several technical claims invoked in proofs throughout the Appendix. Finally, Section H contains
further numerical results that have not been reported in the paper.1
A Global Game model
A.1 Uniqueness Result
Proposition A There exist " > 0 and x > 0 such that for all " 2 (0; "] and all x 2 (0; x] the
model has a unique equilibrium in monotone strategies.
To prove the above result, I rst characterize the optimal householdsand lendersstrategies in
response to a monotone default strategy by the government. Then I show that in response to these
householdsand lendersstrategies the government indeed nds it optimal to follow a monotone default
strategy. Finally, I show that there exists a unique xed-point of this argument. Before proceeding
any further I introduce notation that will be useful when analyzing the model.
Vancouver School of Economics, University of British Columbia, 6000 Iona Drive, Vancouver, BC V6T
1L4, Canada (e-mail: michal.szkup@ubc.ca)
1The solution to the complete information version of the model, and detailed derivations of the multiplier
and direct e¤ects when agents are uncertain whether announced policies will be implemented, can be found in
the Additional Results document available on the authors website (http://economics.ubc.ca/faculty-and-
sta¤/michal-szkup/).
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Notation 1 I will use the following notation throughout the Appendix:
1. A denotes the default threshold used by the government.
2. A denotes the default threshold expected by the households and lenders.
A.1.1 Households
Suppose that households expect the government to repay its debt if and only if A  A. Household
is optimal investment then solves the households problem specied in Section 2:4. Each household
receives a productivity shock Ai, where Ai = A+ "i and "i 2 [ "; "].
If Ai > A + ", then household i expects no default; in that case,
k2 (Ai) = (1  ) eAif (k1) 
1 + 
.2
If household i receives productivity Ai < A   ", then household i believes that the government will
always default and
k2 (Ai) = (1  ) eAif (k1) Z
1 + 
.
Finally, in the case when Ai 2 (A   ";A + ") the household is uncertain as to whether the gov-
ernment will default. In that case,
k2 (Ai) = (1  ) eAif (k1)  (Ai; ";A)
where
 (Ai; ";A
) =
 (1 + Z) + P (AjAi) + Z (1  P (AjAi))
2 (1 + )
 
q
[ (1 + Z) + P (AjAi) + Z (1  P (AjAi))]2   4Z (1 + )
2 (1 + )
and P (AjAi)  Pr (A < AjAi). It is straightforward to show that  (Ai; ";A) is increasing in
Ai and decreasing in A. This establishes Lemma 1 in the paper.
Next, I perform a change of variables  = "i" , where "i 2 [ "; "] so that  2 [ 1; 1]. This change
of variables turns out to be useful for computing the output in the limiting case as " ! 0, and in
general, when analyzing the e¤ect of changes in ". Dene
 (A+ ";;A) 
8><>:

(1+) when Ai = A+ " > A
 + "
 (Ai; ";A
) when Ai = A+ " 2 (A   ";A + ")
Z
(1+) when Ai = A+ " < A
   "
In what follows I will denote the optimal choice of capital as k2 (A; ;A
) to emphasize its dependence
on A,  and households belief about the default threshold A.
2 It is here that the assumption of full depreciation of householdscapital simplies the model. When the
capital depreciates fully each period, the optimal choice of capital is linear. As we will see below, this will
make the governments default condition near linear in eA.
2
A.1.2 Lenders3
Denote by px = 1=2x and pA = 1=
2
A the precisions of the lendersprivate signals and the prior,
respectively. As usual, it is more convenient to work with precisions rather than standard deviations
or variances.
Let u (1; A;x; A) be the expected payo¤ to lender j from lending to the government when the
average productivity is equal to A, the government uses a threshold strategy with cuto¤ A, and
the other lenders use monotone strategies with cuto¤ x. Similarly, denote by u (0; A;x; A) the
payo¤ to lender j from investing in the risk-free asset. Then
u (1; A;x; A) =
8<: 1 + rmin
n
BR;u2 (A)
S(A;x) ; 1
o
if A  A
0 otherwise
u (0; A;x; A) = 1
Dene u (A;x; A)  u (1; A;x; A)  u (0; A;x; A).
It is immediate to see that for any pair (A; x), and regardless of the governments desired
borrowing function BR;u2 , the function u (A;x
; A) satises a weak single crossing property in A.4
Moreover, it is well-known that a family of normal density functions parameterized by xj(
(px + pA)
1=2

 
A  pxxj+pAA 1px+pA
(px + pA)
 1=2
!)
xj2R
satises the strict monotone likelihood ratio (MLR) property, implying that the above density function
is strictly log-supermodular in (A; xj) (see Athey, 1996). By Theorem 3:2 in Athey (1996),
U (xj ;x
; A) 
Z 1
A
u (A;x; A) (px + pA)
1=2

 
A  pxxj+pAA 1px+pA
(px + pA)
 1=2
!
dA
satises the strict single-crossing property in A. Thus, in response to monotone strategies by the
government and the other lenders, lender j nds it optimal to follow a monotone strategy.
Consider U (x;x; A), the expected utility di¤erence from supplying the funds to the market
versus not supplying them, evaluated at x and let L (A; x)  U (x;x; A). I want to show
that for each A there exists unique x such that L (A; x) = 0. First note that u (A;x; A) as
dened above is increasing in x. This is because S (A;x) = b

1  

x A
p
 1=2
x

is decreasing in x.
Moreover, for all A  A BR;u2 (A) is di¤erentiable in A and therefore u (A;x; A) is piecewise
continuous. Second, note that the product of u (A;x; A) and (px + pA)
1=2

 
A  pxx
+pAA 1
px+pA
(px+pA)
 1=2
!
is di¤erent than 0, at least for all A < A. Then, by Theorem 3:4 in Athey (1996) it follows that
L (A; x) satises a strict single-crossing condition in x. This proves Lemma 2 in the text.
3 In this section I make use of two results established in Athey (1996). The rst of the results, Theorem
3:2 in Athey (1996), establishes that if g satises the weak single-crossing property, and if k is strictly log-
supermodular and k (s; ) has constant support in , then G ()  R
S
g (s) k (s; ) ds satises the strict single-
crossing property in . Theorem 3:4 in Athey (1996) extends this conclusion to the case where g also depends
on  under the additional assumption of piecewise continuity of g .
4A function f (x) ; where f : R ! R, satises a weak single-crossing property in x if for all xH > xL,
f (xL) > 0 implies f (xH)  0.
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A.1.3 The Governments Monotone Default Strategy
Suppose that the households follow investment strategies as characterized above and the lenders use
monotone strategies with a common threshold x. I show that V (A;k2; S) is strictly increasing in
A.
Dene k2 (A;A
)  fk2 (A; ;A)g2[ 1;1], that is, k2 (A) denotes the householdsinvestment
choices when the average productivity is equal to A and when all households expect that the default
threshold is A. Note that if the lenders follow monotone strategies, then S = b
h
1  

x A
x
i
.
Thus, with a slight abuse of notation I will write V (A;k2 (A;A
) ; S) as V (A;k2 (A;A
) ; x).
Finally, let BR;u2 denote the government optimal unconstrained borrowing.
Using the denition of V (A;k2 (A;A
) ; x), substituting for k2 (A) the expression found in
Section A:1:1 and rearranging, we get
V (A;k2 (A;A
) ; x) =
1Z
 1
1
2
log

1   (A+ "; ;A)
Z    (A+ "; ;A)

d+ log

Y R1  B1 +BR

2
ZY R1 + (1  )BD2

+ log

1
Z

+ log

Y R2   (1 + r)BR

2
ZY R2

;
where
BR

2 =
(
BR;u2 (A) if B
R;u
2  S (A; x)
S (A; x) if BR;u2 > S (A; x
)
.
Di¤erentiating with respect to A, simplifying, and taking the limit as  ! 1, we get
@V (A;k2 (A;A
) ; x; A)
@A
 B1  B
R
2
Y R1  B1 +BR2
+
(1 + )BR

2 (1 + r)
Y R2   (1 + r)BR2
: (1)
where I used the observation that if BR

2 = B
R;u
2 (A), then by the optimality of the government
borrowing choices the terms containing @BR

2 =@A add up to 0, while otherwise their sum is strictly
positive.
Add the above fractions on the right-hand side of 1. The resulting numerator can be written as
2 (1 + r)

BR

2
2
 BR2
 
Y R2 + 2 (1 + r)B1   (1 + r) Y R1

+B1Y
R
2 .
This expression is quadratic in BR

2 . Let B
R;1
2 (A) and B
R;2
2 (A) be its two roots. Whether these
roots are real or not depends on the parameters of the model. For all A 2 A;A, dene b (A) =
min
n
BR
;1
2 (A) ; B
R;2
2 (A)
o
if the roots are real, and b (A) = 1 if they are complex. Let b =
minA2[A;A] b (A). It follows that if b < b then the governments best response to monotone strategies
is itself monotone. I assume that the lenderswealth b satises this constraint (Assumption 3 in the
paper).5
5One may wonder how restrictive this assumption is. The answer is that it depends on the parameters.
However, numerical simulations suggest that unless  or Z is very close to 1 both roots are complex, which
means that the bound can be made arbitrarily large (though it has to be nite). In particular, this is the case
for the calibration used in the paper.
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A.1.4 Uniqueness of Equilibrium
In light of the above results, to establish uniqueness it is enough to show that
V (A;k2 (A
; A) ; x (A))
is monotone in A, where k2 (A
)  fk2 (A; ; A)g2[ 1;1] is a vector whose components are the
individual householdsinvestment strategies when the households have the correct expectations about
the default threshold (i.e., A = A), and x is the common signal threshold used by the lenders
when households and lenders expect the default threshold to be A. I denote the optimal lenders
threshold by x (A), to emphasize that it depends on A.
Fix  > 0, where  is a small positive number. Di¤erentiating V (A;k2 (A
) ; x (A)) with
respect to A and taking the limit as  ! 1 we get
dV
dA
=
Z 1
 1
  @@A [Z   ] + [1  ]Z @@A
[1  ] [Z   ] d
+
dBR

2
dA
Y R1  B1 +BR2
  (1 + r)
@BR

2
@A
Y R2   (1 + r)BR2
+
B1  BR2
Y R1  B1 +BR2
+
(1 + 	) (1 + r)BR

2
Y R2   (1 + r)BR2
,
where
	 
R 1
 1
1
2
@
@A f (k2 (A
 + "; ";A)) d
Y R2
!  as "! 0.
Since
lim
"!0
@ Pr (AjA + ")
@A
! 0,
there exists " such that for all " 2 (0; "] we haveZ 1
 1
  @@A [Z   ] + [1  ]Z @@A
[1  ] [Z   ] d <

2
Next, since @S(A
)
@A >  b pAp1=2x
1p
2
! 0 as px ! 1, it follows that there exists a large enough px such
that for all px > px we have
dBR

2
dA
Y R1  B1 +BR2
   (1 + r) @BR2@A
Y R2   (1 + r)BR2
 >  
2
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Finally, following the same argument as in Section A:1:3 one can show that there exists b (") such that
for all b < b (") we have
B1  BR2
Y R1  B1 +BR2
+
(1 + r)BR

2
Y R2   (1 + r)BR2
 > :
Therefore, for all " with 0 < " < " and all px > px we have
dV
dA
>  
2
  
2
+  = 0
implying that there exists a unique default threshold A that satises all the equilibrium conditions.
The above analysis applies to a xed value of A. However, since A 2 A;A, which is a compact
interval, there exists bounds " and px which are independent of A
, such that if " < " and px < px,
then dV=dA is strictly positive for all A 2 A;A. This completes the proof.
6 If @BR

2 =@A
 = @BR;u2 =@A
, then the sum of these terms is 0.
5
B Policy Analysis: Benchmark Case
This Section of the Appendix contains proofs of all the claims made in Section 3 of the paper.
B.1 Proof of Proposition 2
Let  denote a parameter of the model (for concreteness, one can think of the tax rate, in which case
 = ). Then, for given r, the equilibrium conditions can be written as
I (A + ";A; k2 () ;  ) = 0,
which is the equilibrium condition for a households with productivity A + " and which determines
the capital choice for a household with productivity shock ";
L (A; x;  ) = 0,
which is the equilibrium condition that describing the lendersbehavior and which determines x; and
nally,
V

A; fk2 ()g2[ 1;1] ; x;  

= 0
which is the equilibrium condition that describes the governments default decision and determines
A.7
Note that, for each  2 [ 1; 1], the equation I (A + ";A; k2 () ;  ) = 0 species k2 () as a
function of households productivity A+ ", households belief about the default threshold A, and
the policy parameter  . for each  2 [ 1; 1]. Similarly, the equation L (A; x;  ) = 0 determines x
as a function of the lendersbelief about the default threshold A and  . Without loss of generality,
I assume that the households hold the same belief as the lenders in regard to the default threshold. In
equilibrium, A = A, that is the households and lenders hold correct beliefs about the governments
default decision. However, to derive the e¤ect of a change in the householdsand lendersbeliefs on
the default threshold, we have to di¤erentiate between the belief about the threshold held by the
households and lenders and the actual default threshold, where the latter is dened as the level of
productivity at which the government defaults.
(Derivations of the multiplier and the direct e¤ect) To compute the equilibrium change
in A due to a change in  , I compute the total derivatives of the expressions on the both sides of
equilibrium conditions and solve the resulting linear system of equations for dA=d :
I1 ()
dA
d 
+ I2 ()
dA
d 
+ I3 ()
dk2 ()
d 
+ I4 () = 0 (2)
L1
dA
d 
+ L2
dx
d 
+ L3 = 0 (3)
V1
dA
d 
+
1Z
 1
1
2
V2 ()
dk2 ()
d 
d+ V3
dx
d 
+ V4 = 0 (4)
where In is the partial derivative of I (A + ";A; k2 () ;  ) with respect to its nth argument and
similarly for Ln and Vn. dA=d is the total change in agentsbeliefs regarding the government
7Note that this condition implicitly assumes that the governments borrowing and spending decisions are
optimal. In other words, V = 0 determines the productivity default threshold, given that the government
behaves optimally in the case when it repays its debt as well as in the case when it chooses to default.
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default threshold implied by a change in  . In equilibrium, dA=d = dA=d , but for now it is
important to keep the distinction between the two objects.
Solving for dx=d and dk2=d using Equations (3) and (2) we get
dx
d 
=  L1
L2
dA
d 
  L3
L2
dk2 ()
d 
=  I1 ()
I3 ()
dA
d 
  I2 ()
I3 ()
dA
d 
  I4 ()
I3 ()
or, recognizing that @x=@A =  L1=L2, @k2 () =@A =  I1 () =I3 (), @k2 () =@A =  I2 () =I3 (),
and @k2 () =@ =  I4 () =I3 ():
dx
d 
=
@x
@A
dA
d 
+
@x
@ 
dk2 ()
d 
=
@k2 ()
@A
dA
d 
+
@k2 ()
@A
dA
d 
+
@k2 ()
@ 
Substituting the above expressions into Equation (4) and rearranging, we get24V1 + 1Z
 1
1
2
V2 ()
@k2 ()
@A
d
35 dA
d 
= (5)
 
1Z
 1
1
2
V2 ()

@k2 ()
@A
dA
d 
+
@k2 ()
@ 

d V3

@x
@A
dA
d 
+
@x
@ 

 V4,
where
"
V1 +
1R
 1
1
2V2 ()
@k2 ()
@A d
#
captures the e¤ect of an increase in the productivity on the
governments incentives to default.
At this point it is key to di¤erentiate between a change in the households investments due to
a change in the households strategies and a change in the households investments due to merely
a change in productivity holding householdsstrategies xed. Recall that an individual households
investment strategy is a function that maps the individual productivity into an investment choice,
that is it is a map k2 : Ai ! R. Thus, a change in the households strategy is dened as a shift in
this mapping, that is a change in k2 for each Ai. On the other hand, holding household strategies
constant, a change in Ai also a¤ects household is investments: It is simply a movement along the
curve k2 : Ai ! R. Thus, the term V1 +
R 1
 1
1
2V2 ()
@k2 ()
@A d captures the e¤ect of a change in
the productivity on the governments incentives to default holding householdsand lendersstrategies
constant.
Using the above observation, divide Equation (5) by V1 +
R 1
 1
1
2V2 ()
@k2 ()
@A d to obtain
dA
d 
=
 
1R
 1
1
2V2 ()
@k2 ()
@ d
V1 +
1R
 1
1
2V2 ()
@k2 ()
@A d
 
V3
@x
@ 
V1 +
1R
 1
1
2V2 ()
@k2 ()
@A
  V4
V1 +
1R
 1
1
2V2 ()
@k2 ()
@A
 
1R
 1
1
2V2 ()
@k2 ()
@A d
V1  
1R
 1
1
2V2 ()
@k2 ()
@A
dA
d 
  V3
@x
@A
V1  
1R
 1
1
2V2 ()
@k2 ()
@A
dA
d 
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The rst three terms capture the direct e¤ects of a change in  on the equilibrium strategies of the
households, the lendersand the government, respectively, holding householdsand lendersbeliefs
about the default threshold constant (i.e., holding A constant). The two remaining terms capture
the e¤ect of a change in  has on the the householdsand lendersbeliefs. In particular, note that
@A
@ 
=   V4
V1 +
1R
 1
V2
@k2 ()
@A d
,
that is, the third term captures the partial e¤ect of a change in  on the governments default incentives
holding householdsand lendersstrategies and beliefs constant. Similarly,
@A
@x
@x
@A
=
V3
V1 +
1R
 1
V2
@k2 ()
@A
@x
@A
and, slightly abusing notation,
1Z
 1
1
2
@A
@k2 ()
@k2 ()
@A
d =  
1Z
 1
1
2V2 ()
@k2 ()
@A d
V1 +
R 1
 1
1
2V2 ()
@k2 ()
@A
,
where this term captures the e¤ect of a change in the householdsbeliefs on the governments incentives
to default. In a similar fashion,
1Z
 1
1
2
@A
@k2 ()
@k2 ()
@ 
d =  
1Z
 1
1
2V2 ()
@k2 ()
@ d
V1 +
R 1
 1
1
2V2 ()
@k2 ()
@A d
;
where
R 1
 1
1
2
@A
@k2 ()
@k2 ()
@ d captures the e¤ect of a change in the householdsstrategies caused by a
change in  holding the householdsbeliefs about the default threshold, A, constant.
Using the above notation, we obtain
dA
d 
=
1Z
 1
1
2
@A
@k2 ()
@k2 ()
@ 
d+
@A
@x
@x
@ 
+
@A
@ 
+
1Z
 1
1
2
@A
@k2 ()
@k2 ()
@A
d
@A
@ 
+
@A
@x
@x
@A
@A
@ 
In equilibrium, A = A, and so it has to be the case that @A=@ = dA=d . Thus, after
rearranging,
dA
d 
=
@A
@ +
@A
@x
@x
@ +
1R
 1
1
2
@A
@k2 ()
@k2 ()
@ d
1  @A@x @x

@A  
1R
 1
1
2
@A
@k2 ()
@k2 ()
@A d
(6)
Finally, note that
R 1
 1
1
2
@A
@k2 ()
@k2 ()
@ d corresponds simply to
R 1
0
@A
@ki;2
@ki;2
@ di, while the termR 1
 1
1
2
@A
@k2 ()
@k2 ()
@A d corresponds to
R 1
0
1
2
@A
@ki;2
@ki:2
@A di. Thus, we obtain
dA
d 
=
@A
@ +
@A
@x
@x
@ +
R 1
0
@A
@ki;2
@ki;2
@ di
1  @A@x @x

@A  
R 1
0
@A
@ki;2
@ki;2
@A di
;
which corresponds to Equation (2) in the paper.
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(Establishing that M>1) Recall from the proof of uniqueness that the government default
condition, after taking into account the dual role of A as the average value of productivity in the
economy and the default threshold, is strictly increasing in A. Thus,
V1 +
Z 1
 1
1
2
V2 ()
@k2 ()
@A
d+
Z 1
 1
1
2
V2 ()
@k2 ()
@A

A=A
d+ V3
@x
@A

A=A
> 0,
where the third and fourth terms capture the e¤ect of a change in the households and lenders
beliefs, respectively. Dividing the above expression by V1 +
R 1
 1
1
2V2 ()
@k2 ()
@A d establishes the
non-negativity of the multiplier e¤ect.
Under Assumption 4 we have B
R;u
2 (A)
S(A;x) = 1 for all A, and hence it can be shown that x
 =
px+pA
px
A  pApx A 1 +
p
px+pA
px
 1

1
1+r

, implying that @A

@x
@x
@A > 0. Similarly, it is straightforward
to show that @k2=@A
 < 0. Since a higher investment by all households decreases the governments
incentives to default (
R 1
 1
1
2@A
=@k2 () d < 0), we have
R 1
 1
1
2
@A
@k2 ()
@k2 ()
@A d > 0. It follows that the
denominator of the multiplier e¤ect is less than 1, so that the multiplier e¤ect is greater than 1.
B.2 Policies
The default threshold is determined by the following condition:
0 = V (A;k2; x
) =
Z 1
 1
log
 
cR1

d+ log

Y R1  B1 +BR

2

(7)
+
Z 1
 1
log
 
cR2

d+ log

Y R2   (1 + r)BR

2

 
Z 1
 1
log
 
cD1

d  log  ZY R1 
 
Z 1
 1
log
 
cD2

d  log  ZY R2  ,
where cRt and c
D
t are the consumption in period t in repayment and default, respectively, Y
R
t is the
total output of the economy in period t, and BR

2 is the equilibrium borrowing by the government,
all evaluated at the threshold productivity A. Before proceeding further, note that
R
log

cRt
cDt

d is
independent of  and k1 for t = 1; 2, and thus policy change will a¤ect the governments incentive to
default only through its e¤ect on government spending in repayment and in default.8 Equation (7)
plays a key role in establishing Propositions 3, 4 and 5.9
B.2.1 Proof of Proposition 3 and Corollary 1
Di¤erentiate V (A;k2; x
) with respect to  to obtain
uRg1Y
R
1 + u
R
g2Y
R
2 + u
R
g2
@Y R2
@
  uDg1ZY R1 + uDg2Y R2 + uDg2Z
@Y R2
@
,
where uRgt and u
D
gt are the marginal utility from government spending in period t in repayment and
default, respectively, and Y R1 the total output of the economy in period t in repayment, all evaluated
8This is because cD2 = Zc
R
2 , c
D
1 = Z (1  ) eAif (k1)  k2, cR1 = (1  ) eAif (k1)  k2, and k2 is linear in
f (k1) and  .
9Equations (3) and (4) can be computed directly from Equation 7.
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at A.10 Given householdsinvestment choices, @Y R2 =@ =

1  . Thus, rearranging the terms in the
above expression, we obtain
Y R1 (1  Z)uDg1 + Y R2 (1  Z)uDg1| {z }
Di¤erential increase in tax revenues
+ Y R1

uRg1   uDg1

+ Y R2

uRg2   uDg2
| {z }
Concavity e¤ect
  @Y
R
2
@


uRg2   ZuDg2

| {z }
Investment distortion
which corresponds to the expression (3) in the paper.
By noting that uDgt = 1=
 
ZY Rt

, uRg1 = 1= (Y1  B1 +B2) and uRg2 = 1= (Y2   (1 + r)B2) one
can write the above condition as
(B1  B2)
Y1  B1 +B2 +
(1 + r)B2
Y2   (1 + r)B2  

1  
(1 + r)B2
Y2   (1 + r)B2 (8)
The rst part of Proposition 3 follows from the observation that, according to the proof of equi-
librium uniqueness, (B1 B2)Y1 B1+B2 +
(1+r)B2
Y2 (1+r)B2 is bounded away from 0 while

1  ! 0 as  ! 0. The
second part of the Proposition 3 follows from the observation that limx!1 S = b
h
1  

x A
x
i
=
b r1+r . Thus, if B1 > rb then the rst term is Equation 8 is positive. It follows that as long as 1 >

1 
then an increase in  will decrease the probability of default. Rearranging this inequality we arrive at
the inequality stated in the text.
The proof of Corollary follows from the observation that limA 1! 1 S = 0 in which case 8
becomes B1Y1 B1 > 0.
B.2.2 Proof of Proposition 4
The proof of Proposition 4 is similar to the proof of Proposition 3. I consider only a stimulus nanced
with short-term debt. The case of a stimulus nanced with long-term debt is analogous.
Note rst that when the government engages in a scal stimulus nanced with short-term debt
that matures at the end of period 1, government spending in repayment in period 1 becomes Y R1  
B1+B
R
2  
 
1 + rST

sk1, where sk1 is the size of stimulus. The positive e¤ect of such a stimulus is that
it leads to expansion of output. Di¤erentiating both sides of the government indi¤erence condition
with respect to s, and rearranging, we get
@Y1
@s
 (1  Z)uDg1 +
@Y2
@s
 (1  Z)uDg2| {z }
Di¤erential increase in tax revenues
+ 
@Y1
@s

uRg1   uDg1

+ 
@Y2
@s

uRg2   uDg2

| {z }
Concavity e¤ect
   1 + rST  k1uRg1| {z }
Increase in debt
When the government engages in a stimulus, ki2 = (1  ) eAif (k1 (1 + s))  (Ai; ";A), and thus
@Y1
@s
=

1 + s
Y R1 and
@Y2
@s
=
2
1 + s
Y R2
Following similar steps as in the proof of Proposition 3 one simplify the above equation for the e¤ect
of stimulus to
 (B1  B2)
Y R1  B1 +B2
+
2B2
Y R2   (1 + r)B2
 
 
1 + rST

k1
Y R1  B1 +B2
(9)
10There is no e¤ect of a change of  on BR2 , the equilibrium level of borrowing, since under Assumption
4, BR2 = S (A; x
) and @S (A; x) =@ = 0. If Assumption 4 were relaxed there would be an additional
term capturing the potential impact of a change in taxes on government borrowing in equilibrium (via the
competition e¤ect among lenders).
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To establish the proposition note rst that uRg1  uRg2 (with equality only if the government can
borrow the unconstrained optimal amount) and, thus
 (B1  B2)uRg1 + 2 (1 + r)B2uRg2  
 
1 + rST

k1u
R
g1 <

B1  
 
1 + rST

k1

uRg1
where the right-most expression is negative as long as B1=k1 <
 
1 + rST

(1=). Moreover,
 (B1  B2)uRg1 + 2 (1 + r)B2uRg2  
 
1 + rST

k1u
R
g1 > u
R
g1

 (B1  B2) 
 
1 + rST

k1

where the last term is positive for su¢ ciently high B1 (as B2 < b 2 R). Thus, for su¢ ciently high B1
stimulus increases governments incentives to repay its debt. Finally, by continuity of expression in 9
we know that there exists B1 such that this expression is equal to 0 and hence @A=@s = 0. It is easy
to see that at such B1 the derivative of expression in 9 is positive which implies that there exists unique
B1 such that if B1 < B1 then stimulus decreases governments incentives to repay its debt while the
opposite is true when B1 > B1. Finally note that since  < 1 and Y R1  B1 +B2 < Y R2   (1 + r)B2
it follows that expression in 9 is necessarily negative if B1 <
 
1 + rST

k1. This establishes the
proposition.
When the stimulus is nanced with long-term debt then the last term of the expression in 9
becomes
 
1 + rLT

k1=
 
Y R2   (1 + r)B2

. It follows that in this case expression 9 is necessarily
negative when B1uRg1 <
 
1 + rST

k1u
R
g2
C Additional Results
C.1 Predictions when debt crisis are driven by fundamentals
One may wonder how the predictions of the model with dispersed information and endogenous ex-
pectations di¤er from predictions of the model were default is driven purely by fundamentals. To
answer this question, I consider the model of Section 1, but allow agents to observe A and coordinate
their beliefs on repayment equilibrium whenever A belongs to the fragility region.In this case, the
government defaults only when fundamentals are poor enough, which happens when A < A (i.e.,
below the lower bound of the fragility region). I refer to this version of the model as the model with
fundamental crises only.The question is then whether the government policies considered above have
the same e¤ect on the threshold A as they have on the threshold A.
There are two forces that lead to potentially di¤erent predictions based on the model with self-
fullling crises and dispersed information compared to the model with fundamental crises only. First,
since A > A it follows that the government revenues are higher at the default threshold in the model
with self-fullling beliefs and dispersed information. This tends to decrease the benet of policies
that expand government income, such as stimulus or increase in taxes. Second, under dispersed
information, the government is unable to roll over its maturing debt as those lenders who receive low
signals decide not to supply their funds to the government. As the consequence, in the model with
dispersed information if the government repays its debt then its expenditure is substantially lower
in period 1 than in period 2. This in turn implies that policies which result in a larger increase in
governments revenues in period 1 than in period 2 (such as scal stimulus) or policies whose negative
e¤ect fall in period 2 (such as an increase in taxes) tend to decrease the governments incentives to
default by more under dispersed information. The next proposition states the conditions under which
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the latter e¤ect dominates and hence government policies tend to be more e¤ective under dispersed
information.
Proposition B Let  2 f ; sg and keep other parameters of the model xed. Then there exists A 1
such that for all A 1 < A 1 we have
dA=d < 0 =) dA=d < 0
but not vice versa.
The above proposition follows from the observation that when the past level of productivity is
low, that is low A 1, then the supply of funds in the bond market is low, holding everything else
constant. Thus, when A 1 is su¢ ciently low and if austerity or stimulus decreases probability of
default according to the model with only fundamental crises then it also does so according to the
model with dispersed information and self-fullling crises, but not vice versa. Indeed, if B1=k1 > 1=
then the two models will provide opposite predictions as according to the model with self-fullling
crises and dispersed beliefs stimulus will decrease probability of default while according to the model
with only fundamental crises stimulus will increase probability of default. A similar observation applies
to an increase in taxes when  is already high. Thus, there are situations when predictions of the two
models will substantially di¤er not only quantitatively but also qualitatively.
Proposition B follows the following two results. The rst of the two results provide a general
conditions under which we have the two models provide di¤erent predictions. the second result
derives the su¢ cient conditions under which we have @A@ < 0 =) @A

@ < 0 or
@A
@s < 0 =) @A

@s .
Lemma C.1 Let A and A be the default thresholds in the model with self-fullling crises and dis-
persed information and in the model with only fundamental crises, respectively.
1. Consider an increase in taxes. For each A there exists B

> 0 such that
(a) If B2 (A
) < B

then @A@ < 0 =) @A

@ < 0.
(b) If B2 (A
) = B

then @A@ < 0() @A

@ < 0.
(c) If B2 (A
) > B

then @A@ < 0(= @A

@ > 0.
2. Consider a scal stimulus (nanced either by short-term or long-term debt). For each A there
exists B
s
> 0 such that
(a) If B2 (A
) < B
s
then @A@s < 0 =) @A

@s < 0.
(b) If B2 (A
) = B
s
then @A@s < 0() @A@s < 0.
(c) If B2 (A
) > B
s
then @A@s < 0(= @A

@s > 0.
Proof. I only prove the rst part of the proposition since the proof of part 2 is analogous. First
consider the e¤ect of a higher tax rate when crises occur for all A < A only (i.e., fundamentals driven
crises). Then, @A=@ < 0 if and only if
B1  BR;u2

Y1  B1 +BR;u2
+
(1 + r)BR;u2
Y2   (1 + r)BR;u2
  
1  
(1 + r)BR;u2
Y2   (1 + r)BR;u2
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where BR;u2 is the unconstrained optimal borrowing by the government, which satises
1
Y1  B1 +BR;u2
=
(1 + r)
Y2   (1 + r)BR;u2
Therefore, the condition for @A=@ < 0 can be simplied to
B1   
1   B
R;u
2 (A) > 0 (10)
Next, recall from the Proposition 3 that @A=@ < 0 if and only if
B1  B2 (A) +
(1 + r)ug2 (A
)
ug1 (A
)
B2 (A
)

1  
1  

> 0 (11)
where B2 (A
) is the equilibrium government borrowing at A = A and ugt (A
) is the marginal utility
of government spending at time t = f1; 2g. To establish the rst part of the proposition I need to
show that there exists B

> 0 such that

1   B
R;u
2 (A) > B2  
(1 + r)ug2 (A
)
ug1 (A
)
B2

1  
1  

(12)
if and only if B2 < B

.
Towards this goal note that if B2 = 0 then the inequality in Equation (12) is satised. Next, recall
that governments desired borrowing is increasing in A, and thus BR;u2 (A) < B
R;u
2 (A
). Moreover, if
the government can borrow desired amount then (1 + r)ug2 (A
) = ug1 (A
). Hence, at B2 = B
R;u
2 (A
)
then the inequality in Equation (12) is reversed. By continuity of the RHS of Equation (12) it follows
that there exists B

> 0 such that

1   B
R;u
2 (A) = B
   (1 + r)u
g
2 (A
)
ug1 (A
)
B


1  
1  

I now argue that such B

is unique.
First, note that
@
@B2

B2 (A
)  (1 + r)u
g
2
ug1
B2 (A
)

1  
1  

= 1  (1 + r)u
g
2
ug1

1  
1  

| {z }
>0
  (1 + r) (ug2)

(1 + r)ug2
ug1
+ 1

B2 (A
)

1  
1  

where we used the observation that
@ug1
@B2
=
 1
[eAf (k1) B1 +B2]2
= (ug1)
2 and
@ug2
@B2
=
(1 + r)
[eAf (k2)  (1 + r)B2]2
= (1 + r) (ug2)
2
If 1  = (1  )  0 the above derivative is positive and the claim follows. Thus, in what follows I
suppose that 1  = (1  ) > 0.
Note that
@
@B2
(1 + r)ug2
ug1
> 0,
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and thus
@
@ (B2)
2

B2   (1 + r)u
g
2
ug1
B2

1  
1  

= 1  (1 + r)u
g
2
ug1

1  
1  

  (1 + r)ug2

(1 + r)ug2
ug1
+ 1

B2

1  
1  

=  

1  
1  

@
@B2

(1 + r)ug2
ug1

  (1 + r)ug2

(1 + r)ug2
ug1
+ 1
 
1  
1  

  (1 + r)ug2B2

1  
1  

@
@B2

(1 + r)ug2
ug1

< 0
it follows that
B2   (1 + r)u
g
2
ug1
B2

1  
1  

is concave in B2. Together with observations that at B2 = 0 we have
@
@B2

B2   (1 + r)u
g
2
ug1
B2

1  
1  

> 0
and at B2 = B
R;u
2 (A
) we have
BR;u2 (A
)  (1 + r)u
g
2
ug1
BR;u2 (A
)

1  
1  

=

1   B
R;u
2 (A
)  B2 (A)

1  
the concavity of B2 (A)   (1+r)u
g
2
ug1
B2 (A
)
h
1  1 
i
implies that there exists a unique value of B

such that
B
   (1 + r)u
g
2
ug1
B


1  
1  

= B2 (A)

1  
This establishes the result for the case when 1  = (1  ) > 0.
C.2 Higher tax rate in repayment only
Consider now the case when the government implements an increase in taxes only in the case it repays
the debt. Let R denote the tax rate in repayment and D the tax rate in default where initially
R = D =  . An increase in the tax rate only in repayment is captured by an increase in R holding
D constant.
An increase in R can be analyzed the same way as an increase in  considered above. A higher
R leads to a change in the governments incentives to repay the debt equal to
Y R1 u
R
g1 + Y
R
2 u
R
g2| {z }
Increase in the governments
revenue in repayment
 
1Z
i=0

uRc1
@cR1
@R
+ uRc2
@cR2
@R
  uDc1
@cD1
@R
  uDc2
@cD2
@R

di
| {z }
Di¤erential decrease
in private consumption
  R @Y
R
2
@R
 
uRg2   ZuDg2

| {z }
Investment distortion
(13)
where, uRgt and u
D
gt are the marginal utilities from the government spending in period t in repayment
and default, respectively, uRct and c
R
t are household is marginal utility from the private consumption
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and private consumption at time t in repayment, and Y Rt is the total output of the economy in period
t in repayment, all evaluated at the threshold A. If the expression in (13) is positive, then the
governments incentives to repay its debt increase following an increase in R.
There are three noticeable di¤erences compared to the case when the tax rate is increased in both
repayment and default. First, a higher R increases government tax revenues only in repayment,
which tends to increase the governments incentives to repay the debt more than in the earlier case.
On the other hand, a higher R decreases the governments incentives to repay by decreasing private
consumption in repayment by more than in default (private consumption in default is a¤ected indi-
rectly through the change in households investment strategies). Finally, the investment distortion
e¤ect, while still present, is now smaller since the households are uncertain whether the announced
tax increase will be implemented at the time they make their investment decisions.
While a choice whether to increase the tax rate only in repayment or both in repayment and in
default is most likely determined by the political constraints, it is of interest to compare the e¤ect of
increasing R against increasing the tax rate in both repayment and default. The following proposition
establishes that an increase only in R leads to a larger increase in the governments incentives to
repay then an increase in both R and D when initial tax rate is low while the opposite is true when
the initial tax rate is high.
Proposition C Let @V
@R
and @V@ denote the e¤ect on the government incentives of increasing the
tax rate only in repayment and both in repayment in default, respectively. Then there exists  and  ,
with 0 <  <  < 1 such that
1. If  >  then @V
@R
< @V@ .
2. If  <  then @V
@R
> @V@ :
To understand this result note that when the tax rate is initially low then householdsprivate
consumption is relatively high while government spending is relatively low. Thus, the negative e¤ect
of higher R on the utility from the private consumption in repayment is small while the the positive
e¤ect of higher D on the utility from the government spending would be high. It follows that at if
initially both R = D =  where  is low then increasing only R has larger e¤ect on the government
incentives to repay than increasing both R and D at the same time; the opposite is true when the
initial tax level is low.
Proof of Proposition C. Let R denote the tax rate in repayment and D denote the tax rate in
default. When R 6= D then solving problem of a household with productivity Ai = A + " we get
k2
 
A + "; ; "; R; D

= eA+"f (k1) 
 
A + "; ; "; R; D

where

 
A + "; ; "; R; D
   (A + "; ; ") 
q
 (A + "; ; ")2   4Z (1 + ) (1  R) (1  D)
2 (1 + )
 (A + "; ; ")  (P (") + )  1  R+ Z (1  P (") + )  1  D
Note that if R = D the expression for k2 becomes identical to the expression reported in Section
A.1.1 of this Appendix. Moreover, it can be shown that
@k2
 
A + "; ; "; R; D

@R
2

  1
1   k1; 0

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as  varies from  1 to 1.11 The above discussion implies that
@Y2
@R
=
@
@R
1Z
= 1
k2 (A
 + "; ;A) d <

1  
1Z
= 1
k2 (A
 + "; ;A) d
and hence, as remarked in the text, the distortionary e¤ect of higher taxes is lower when the higher
tax is implemented only in repayment.
Next di¤erentiating V (as dened in Section A.1.3) with respect to R, imposing that initially
R = R =  , and simplifying, we obtain
@V
@R
=  
1Z
= 1
1
(1  ) (1   ())d 
1Z
= 1
@k2
@R
(1  ) eAf (k1) (1   ())

1  1
Z

d  1
1  | {z }
The e¤ect of a higher R on the private consumption in repayment versus default
+
Y1
Y1  B1 +B2 +
Y2
Y2   (1 + r)B2| {z }
An increase in government tax revenues in repayment
+
 @Y2
@R
Y2   (1 + r)B2  
@Y2
@R
Y2| {z }
Investment distortion in repayment versus default
Now,
 () 2

Z
1 + 
;

1 + a

and
@Y2
@R
2

0;

1  

,
and therefore,
@V
@R
<
Y1
Y1  B1 +B2  
1
1   +
Y2
Y2   (1 + r)B2  
1
1  
  @Y2
@R

1
Y2   (1 + r)B2  
1
Y2

  1
1  
Z
1 +   Z
and
@V
@R
>
Y1
Y1  B1 +B2  
1
1   +
Y2
Y2   (1 + r)B2  
1
1  
  @Y2
@R

1
Y2   (1 + r)B2  
1
Y2

  
1  
1
Z
We obtained the upper bound and lower bound for the e¤ect of an increase in R The result then
follows from comparing the upper bound and the lower bound for @V=@R with the expression for
@V=@ derived in the proof of Proposition 3. In particular, one can show that for all low enough
 the lower bound for @V=@R is greater than @V=@ . Similarly, for high enough  , the upper
bound for @V=@R is smaller than @V=@ .
11When  =  1 then P (") = 1 which means that these households expect default with probability 1 and as a
consequence they assign probability 0 to taxes being increased and leave their investment decisions unchanged.
On the other end of the spectrum lie households which received  = 1.
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D Policy Adjustments under Uncertainty
To derive the change in the default threshold when households and lenders are uncertain as to whether
the policy change will be implemented, I start by considering a situation where with probability (1  p)
the policy parameter takes value  (which I associate with the case when the policy change is not
implemented) and with probability p the policy parameter takes value  0 (which I associate with the
new level of the policy parameter if the policy is implemented). I then follow the same steps as in the
proof of Proposition 2 to compute the e¤ect of a further change in  0. Finally, I impose the condition
that initially  0 =  . By following these steps, I obtain the e¤ect of an announcement of a change in
the policy parameter when such a change will take place with probability p.
Let A be the threshold if the policy parameter takes value  (i.e., the policy change is not
implemented) and A0 the policy threshold when the policy parameter takes value  0 (i.e., the policy
change is implemented).12 Then the equilibrium conditions can be written as
(1  p) I (A + ";A; k2 () ;  ) + pI
 
A + ";A0; k2 () ;  
0 = 0 (14)
(1  p) I (A0 + ";A; k02 () ;  ) + pI
 
A0 + ";A0; k02 () ;  
0 = 0 (15)
(1  p)L (A; x;  ) + pL  A0; x;  0 = 0 (16)
V

A; fk2 ()g2[ 1;1] ; x; A;  

= 0 (17)
V

A0; fk2 ()g2[ 1;1] ; x; A0;  0

= 0; (18)
where k2 () denotes an individual households equilibrium investment when that households produc-
tivity is equal to A + ", while k02 denotes the individual households equilibrium investment when
that households productivity is equal A0 + ".
When households and lenders are uncertain whether an announced policy will be implemented
there are additional equilibrium equations compared to the case considered in Section B of this
appendix. This is because we need to determine the default threshold both when the policy in
implemented and when it is not (the possibility of a policy change also a¤ects the threshold even if in
the end the policy is not implemented). In particular, to compute the equilibrium default threshold
when the policy parameter takes value  , we need both the governments default condition and the
household investment decisions evaluated both evaluated at  (Equations 14 and 17). Similarly, to
compute the equilibrium default threshold when the policy parameter takes value  0, we need both
the governments default condition and the household investment conditions evaluated both evaluated
at  0 (Equations 15 and 18).
To compute the e¤ect of a policy announcement when the policy is expected to be implemented
with probability p, one can follow an approach similar to the one in Section B of this appendix, that
is consider the total derivatives of both sides of all equilibrium condition with respect to  0. Solving
the resulting system of equations for dA=d and dA0=d 0 and evaluating all derivatives at  =  0
(since we consider a small policy change from its initial level at  ) yields the desired result.13
12For example, if the relevant policy parameter is a tax rate  and the government contemplates increasing
the tax rate to  0 >  then  =  while  0 =  0.
13The detailed derivations can be found in the Additional Resultsdocument available on authors website.
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D.1 Proofs of Propositions 5
That dA=d = @A=@ when a policy change in unexpected is immediate from the discussion of
Proposition 5 is the main text. Thus, it remains to show that limx;"!0 @A
=@ = 0. For simplicity,
I consider the case when only "! 0.
Note that lim"!0
@ Pr(AjA+")
@A

A=A
= 1 (see Claim 4 in Section G of this appendix), and
thus from expression for k2 (A
 + "; ;A) we obtain lim"!0
@k2 (A
+";;A)
@A

A=A
=1.14 From
this it follows that V1 +
R 1
 1
1
2V2 ()
@k2 ()
@A d ! 1 as " ! 0. Now, recall from the proof of
Proposition 2 that
@A
@ 
=   V4
V1 +
1R
 1
V2
@k2 ()
@A d
V4 = @V=@ is well-dened for each parameter of the model, and hence nite. It follows that
lim
"!0
@A
@ 
= 0
D.2 Proof of Corollary 2
Corollary 2 follows from Propositions 3  5.
D.3 Proof of Propositions 6
Proposition 6 follows from Equation (5) in the paper which states that dA

d (p) = p
dA
d (1)+(1  p) @A

@ ,
Proposition 5 and Corollary 2.
D.4 Discussion of Assumption 5
The above analysis was conducted under the following assumption:
Assumption 5 B1 is large enough so that for all A > A(0) the governments desired borrowing in
repayment exceeds the supply of funds in the market.
To determine a bound on B1, which is assumed implicitly in Assumption 5, assume that interest
rate r is less than br for some arbitrarily high br. Note that the unconstrained optimal borrowing by
the government in repayment is given by
BR;u2 =
(1 + r)B1 + Y
R
2   (1 + r) Y R1
2 (1 + r)
.
For a xed r < br, a higher B1 increases B2, not only directly, but also indirectly by shifting the
lower bound of the fragility region, A (r), upwards. For su¢ ciently high A (r), we have Y R2 (A (r)) >
Y R1 (A (r)), where Y
R
t (A) denotes the total output at time t when average productivity is A. More-
over, @Y R2 =@A = (1 + )Y
R
2 and @Y
R
1 =@A = Y
R
1 , implying that once A (r) is high enough so that
Y R2 (A (r)) > Y
R
1 (A (r)), a further increase in A (r) leads to an increase in Y
R
2   (1 + r) Y R1 , and
hence in the desired borrowing. It follows that for a xed b and a xed r, there exists a high enough
14For the proof of this statement and other statements regarding the limiting behavior of P (AjA + "),
see Section F of this appendix.
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B1 such that B
R;u
2 > b. Since [0; br] is a compact interval there exists a high enough B1, call it bB1;
such that if B1 > bB1 then BR;u2 > b for all r 2 [0; br].
Assumption 5 simplies the lenders problem. The di¢ cult part of the lenders problem is the
competition e¤ect: Ceteris paribus, a higher supply of funds in the bond market decreases the lenders
expected return from lending. This e¤ect, however, is not present when BR;u2 > b, in which case there
exists a closed-form solution for x. In particular, under Assumption 5, we have
x =
px + pA
px
A   pA
px
A 1 +
p
px + pA
px
 1

1
1 + r

.15
This in turn substantially simplies the analysis presented in Sections 3 and 4 of the paper.16 In
Section G of this appendix, I discuss briey how the result change if Assumption 5 is not imposed in
Section F of this Appendix.
E Discussion of Assumptions 15
E.1 Assumptions 14
To solve the model described in Section 1 of the paper, I imposed Assumptions 14 (Section 2:1 in
the paper). Assumption 1, which states that B1  B1 is needed to make the problem interesting.
It is straightforward to show that the unconstrained optimal borrowing by the government when the
interest rate is r = 0 is given by
BR;u2 =
B1 + Y2   Y1
2
If B1 is low, then the government might have no incentives to borrow in the fragility region (low
B1 means that the fragility region contains low values of productivity A, for which Y2 tends to be
substantially smaller than Y1). But in this case lendersexpectations stop playing role in the model.
By imposing an appropriate lower bound on B1, I can ensure that the government will always want
to borrow in the fragility region.17
Assumption 2 imposes a bound on the total wealth of the lenders. This is needed for two reasons.
First of all, an individual lenders wealth has to be bounded, since (given the assumption of risk-
neutrality) after receiving a good signal he always supplies all his funds to the market. Thus, if
lenders had an innite amount of funds, the government would always be able to borrow funds from
the few agents that receive high signals. Second, a bound on b is needed to ensure that V (A;k2; x
)
is increasing. The details of establishing the bound on b can be found in sections A:1:3 and A:1.4 in
this appendix.18
15Derivations of the threshold x when there is no competition e¤ect are standard and can be found, for
example, in Szkup and Trevino (2015).
16Assuming that lenders ignore the competition e¤ect would have the same implications.
17The details of deriving a su¢ cient bound on B1 can be in Addtional Resultsdocument on the authors
website.
18As shown in Section A of this appendix @V=@A depends on B2, the amount that the government can
borrow. A bound on b, and hence on B2, ensures that @V=@A > 0 for all A in the fragility region and for
all possible choices of B2, that is for all B2 2 [0; b]. As numerical simulations suggest, unless parameters are
extreme (Z is close to 1 or  close to 1) this is not an issue. However, analytically this is hard to show and
hence I take care of this issue by imposing an appropriate bound on b.
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Assumption 3 implies that BR;u2 is increasing in the fragility region. This simplies the analysis of
the lenders problem (when the stronger Assumption 5 is not imposed), and I use it to establish that
x is increasing in A. Under Assumption 3, a lender who observes a higher signal not only believes
that default is less likely but also that he will be able to lend more to the government. The details of
the derivations of the bound on Z can be found in Section A:5 in the Additional Resultsdocument
on the authors website. Numerical simulations suggest that this assumption is not crucial for the
model to have a unique equilibrium in monotone strategies.
Finally, Assumption 4 imposes that the legacy costsof defaulting are large, that is  ! 1. This
assumption is needed to ensure existence of (1) the fragility region for any parameter values, and (2)
existence and uniqueness of equilibrium. When  < 1 then it is possible that for some parameter
values the fragility region does not exists. This is because in this case the governments incentives
to default are very strong since not only the government will not have to repay its initial debt B1,
but also it will be able to use some of the new borrowing to increase its spending. This can make
governments incentive to default so strong that it will always default for intermediate values of A
(i.e., for all A < A). For example, in Cole and Kehoe (2000) we have  = 0 and they can only ensure
existence of the fragility region when the fraction of output lost in default is close to 1 or when the
government does not care much about its spending compared to private consumption. A separate
issue is created by the fact that lenders do not observe A. As noted by Kletzer (1984) in debt crises
models with asymmetric information there might not exist an equilibrium. Under Assumption 4 this
is not the issue, and indeed I construct explicitly an equilibrium and show that it is unique (Section
A of this Appendix).
E.2 Policy Analysis without Assumption 5
Assumption 5 is useful, since it simplies the lenders problem. However, one can obtain a similar
decomposition of dA=d when Assumption 5 is not imposed.
Without Assumption 5, a change in householdsinvestment strategies will a¤ect the lendersequi-
librium behavior. This is because the governments desired unconstrained borrowing, BR;u2 , depends
on Y2, and a change in B
R;u
2 translate into a change in x
. Thus, the lendersindi¤erence condition
has to be written as
L (A; x;  ; k2) = 0
rather than as L (A; x;  ) = 0. This is the only change compared to the case when Assumption 4
is imposed. Following the same steps, one can show that
dA
d 
=
@A
@ +
R 1
0
@A
@ki2
@ki2
@ di+
@A
@x
h
@x
@ +
R 1
0
@x
@ki2
@ki2
@ di
i
1  R 1
0
@A
@ki2
@ki2
@A di  @A

@x
h
@x
@A +
R 1
0
@x
@ki2
@ki2
@A di
i
Thus, compared to the case when Assumption 5 holds, there is an additional term in the expression
for the direct e¤ect, @A

@x
1R
0
@x
@ki2
@ki2
@ di. This is because a change in  leads to an adjustment in the
households investment which a¤ects the governments desired borrowing. Without Assumption 5
there is competition e¤ect: a higher supply of funds to the bond market tends to mean less lending
per lender. Thus, a change in the households investment strategies leads to an adjustment in x.
Similarly, the multiplier e¤ect has an additional term equal to @A

@x
1R
0
@x
@ki2
@ki2
@A di, since now a change in
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householdsexpectations a¤ects the lendersbehavior through its impact on the governments desired
borrowing.
There are two main reasons why in the paper I consider a case when Assumption 5 holds. First
of all, Assumption 5 substantially simplies the subsequent analysis. This is particularly true when
considering e¤ects of an increase in taxes and of a scal stimulus, or when deriving an expression for
dA=d , since
R 1
0

@x=@ki2

[@k2=@ di] is a complicated object and can be computed only implicitly.
Second, numerical simulations suggests that the competition e¤ect, which is assumed away when
Assumption 5 is imposed, plays only a minor role when determining the desirability of a particular
policy.
F The E¤ect of the Interest Rate on Policy Adjustments
Above I analyzed the case when the policy change takes place after the interest rate has been set, and
thus the change in the policy and the resulting change in the default threshold A do not a¤ect the
interest rate r. In this section I analyze what happens when the policy change is announced before
the government chooses the interest rate, in which case we have to take into account how a policy
change a¤ects the choice of interest rate and how this change in the interest rate a¤ects the default
threshold.
Recall that the government chooses the interest rate to maximize the ex-ante welfare. The optimal
interest rate is then the solution to the rst-order condition associated with this problem, which can
be written as
R (A; k2; x;  ; r) = 0
Here, we recognize that r depends on the governments future decisions, households investment
choices, and lenderssupply decisions. The choice of r is also a¤ected by the policy parameters, since
 a¤ects the gains and costs associated with a higher r.
Following the same approach as in Section B:1 of this appendix I nd that the total e¤ect of a
change in policy  on the default threshold is given by
dA
d 
= MTotal

1  @A

@x
@x
@A
 
Z 1
i=0
@A
@k2
@k2
@A
di
24 @A@ + @A@x @x@ + R 1i=0 @A@k2 @ki2@ di
1  @A@x @x

@A  
R 1
i=0
@A
@k2
@k2
@A di
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+MTotal

1  @r

@x
@x
@A
 
Z 1
i=0
@r
@k2
@k2
@A
di
24

@A
@r +
@A
@x
@x
@r

@r
@ +
@r
@x
@x
@ +
R 1
i=0
@r
@k2
@k2
@ di

1  @r@x @x

@A  
R 1
i=0
@r
@k2
@k2
@A di
35 ,
where MTotal is the (total) multiplier e¤ect that is present in the model when r can adjust; is given
by
MTotal =
1
1  @A@x @x

@A  
R 1
i=0
@A
@k2
@k2
@A di 
( @A@r +
@A
@x
@x
@r )
1  @r
@x
@x
@r

@r
@x
@x
@A +
R 1
i=0
@r
@k2
@k2
@A di
 .19
To understand the above expression, note rst that
h
1  @A@x @x

@A  
R 1
i=0
@A
@k2
@k2
@A
i 1
is the multiplier
e¤ect in the case when we hold the interest constant, and
h
1  @r@x @x

@A  
R 1
i=0
@r
@k2
@k2
@A
i 1
is the
19The above expression can be derived by following the same steps as in Section B:1.
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multiplier e¤ect in the case when the governments default decision is a¤ected by the change in
households beliefs only through an implied adjustment in the interest rate. Then the rst term in
the expression for dA=d captures the change in the default threshold implied by a change in the
policy holding the interest rate constant (the expression in the square brackets) weighted by the
relative importance of the partialmultiplier e¤ect (i.e., multiplier e¤ect when r is kept constant
as in Section 3 of the paper) compared to the total multiplier e¤ect, MTotal. This e¤ect is familiar
from the earlier analysis. The second term captures the total change in the default threshold implied
by the adjustment in r. Here,

@A
@r +
@A
@x
@x
@r

@r
@ +
@r
@x
@x
@ +
R 1
i=0
@r
@k2
@k2
@ di

captures the e¤ect
that an adjustment in  has on r (and hence on A) holding householdsand lendersexpectations
constant: A change in  leads to a change in r, which then a¤ects A. This e¤ect is then reinforced
by the associated multiplier e¤ect that results from the initial adjustment in r and is adjusted by
the relative importance of its partial multiplier e¤ect.
How does an adjustment in r alter the e¤ectiveness of various government policies compared
to the case when r is constant? While it is di¢ cult to answer this question analytically, intuition
suggests that an adjustment in r tends to decrease the magnitude of the change in A implied by
 as long as the default threshold A is lower than A 1, the prior of the mean belief about A. To
understand this, note that a decrease in A decreases the benet of a higher r (since a lower A
means that a further decrease in A due to the choice of higher r translates into a lower decrease
in the probability of default) and increases the cost of a higher r (since a fall in A implies that the
government has to incur the cost of a higher r for a larger set of productivity values). The opposite
is true when A increases. This suggests that a policy change that leads to a decrease in A is
accompanied by a decrease r, which decreases the positive e¤ect of the policy adjustment. On the
other hand, a policy change that leads to an increase in A is accompanied by an increase in r, which
tends to partially o¤set the negative e¤ect that such a policy has on the probability of default.
G Auxiliary Results
In this section I provide proofs of several results that have been invoked throughout this appendix.
First, I show that @x=@A < px+pApx . Then I compute limits of several expressions as "; x ! 0 and
which where used in the proof of Proposition 2:
Lemma 2 The derivative of x with respect to A is bounded from above by 
2
x+
2
A
2A
.
Proof. Applying the implicit function theorem to the lendersindi¤erence condition, we get
dx
dA
=  
( 1)

1 + rmin
n
1;
Bu2 (A
)
S(A;x)
o
f (Ajx)
@
@x
1R
A

1 + rmin
n
1;
Bu2 (A)
S(A:x)
o
f (Ajx) dA
 ,
where f (Ajx) is the conditional density of A given lender j observed signal xj = x. Dene Au =n
A  AjBR;u2 (A) < S (A)
o
and Ac =
n
A  AjBR;u2 (A)  S (A)
o
, and note that BR;u2 (A) and
S (A) intersect at most nitely many times. Without loss of generality, I assume that BR;u2 (A) and
S (A) intersect at least once (otherwise, the result follows immediately). Then we can write Au and
Ac as Au = [Nui=1

Aui0 ; A
u
i1

and Ac = [Nci=1
 
Aci0 ; A
c
i1

, where Nu; Nc 2 N,

Aui0
	Nu
i=1
are the values
of the productivity at which BR;u2 (A) intersects S (A) from above and

Aui1
	Nu
i=1
are the values of
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productivity at which BR;u2 (A) intersects S (A) from below.
20 With these denitions, we can write
the above derivative as
dx
dA
=
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1 + rmin
n
1;
BBR;u2 (A)
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f (Ajx)
P
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u
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S(A;x) f (Ajx)
o
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Consider the case where at A = A we have Bu2 (A
)  S (A; x). Then the denominator becomes:
NuX
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S (A; x)
  1
!
f (Ajx)
)
dA
It remains to show that the second of the above terms is positive. Intuitively, that is what we expect,
since a higher x makes high values of A more likely and Bu2 (A) is increasing in A. The remainder of
this proof is devoted to establishing it analytically.
The idea of the next few steps is to change di¤erentiation with respect to x with the di¤erentiation
with respect to A. First, note that, since f (Ajx) = (pA + px)1=2 
 
A  pxx
+pAA 1
px+pA
(pA+px)
 1=2
!
, we have
1Z
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(1 + r) f (Ajx)
Next, let H (A; x) =

Bu2 (A)
S(A;x)   1

f (Ajx). Then,
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,
where, since @BR;u2 (A) =@A > 0 and
@
@xS (A; x
) < 0, the last two terms are strictly positive.21
Moreover, note that for i = 1; :::; Nc we have H
 
Aui1 ; x
 = H  Aui0 ; x = 0. Therefore,
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20 If at A we have S (A; x) > BR;u2 (A), then A
u
10 = A
, Au11 = A
c
10 , A
c
i1 = A
u
20 , and so on. If at A
 we
have S (A; x) < BR;u2 (A) then A
c
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c
20 , and so on.
21The second and third terms correct for the fact that
@
@x
H (A; x) 6=   px
px + pA
@
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H (A; x)
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This establishes the claim for the conclusion of the Lemma when at A = A we have Bu2 (A
) 
S (A; x). The case when Bu2 (A
) < S (A; x) is established in an analogous way.
The next claim has been used in Section A:1:4 to establish uniqueness of equilibrium in monotone
strategies.
Claim 3 lim"!0
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Taking the limit as " ! 0 and using lHôpitals rule one can show that the rst term converges to
A A 1
A
(1 )
2 while the second term converges to A
 A 1
A
(1 )
2 . It follows that lim"!0
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The next two claims have been used in the proof of Proposition 2.
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Di¤erentiating with respect to A, we get
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Taking the limit as "! 0 at A = A, we get
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Using lHôpitals rule, one can establish that
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Similarly, using lHôpitals rule, one can show that the second term converges to 0.
Claim 5 limx!0
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Proof. Note that
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Under Assumption 4, we have x = 
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. The Claim follows immediately from this observation.
Claim 6 We have dA=dA 1 < 0.
Proof. In light of Proposition 2 it is enough to consider the direct e¤ect of increasing A 1. By
inspection, we see that A 1 does not directly a¤ect the government incentives to default. Next, recall
that household is investment choice is given by
k2 (Ai) = (1  ) eAif (k1)  (Ai; ";A)
where
 (Ai; ";A
) =
 (1 + Z) + P (AjAi) + Z (1  P (AjAi))
2 (1 + )
 
q
[ (1 + Z) + P (AjAi) + Z (1  P (AjAi))]2   4Z (1 + )
2 (1 + )
Here, A 1 a¤ects P (AjAi) where P (AjAi)  Pr (A < AjA 1; Ai). Since  (Ai; ";A) is de-
creasing in P (AjAi) and P (AjAi) is decreasing in A 1 it follows that @ (Ai; ";A) =@A 1 is
increasing in A 1. Thus, it follows that an increase in A 1 leads to a higher investment by households.
Since a higher investment strictly decreases governmentsincentives to default we have
1Z
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@A
@k2
@k2
@ 
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Next, consider lenders. Recall that the signal threshold above which lenders supply their funds to
the bond market is dened implicitly byZ 1
A
u (A;x; A) (x + 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where A denote expected default threshold by the lenders. Then
@x
@A 1
=   
x
< 0
Thus, an increase in A 1 leads to a decrease in x implying that lenders supply more funds to the
bond market for any given A. Since a higher supply of funds weakly decreases the governments
default incentives we have
@A
@x
@x
@ 
 0.22 .
The result follows then from Proposition 2.
H Numerical Examples: Further Results
In this section I report additional numerical results. In particular, I investigate how the e¤ects of
adjustments in taxes and of a scal stimulus on the ex-ante probability of default and the importance
of the multiplier e¤ect depend on  and Z.
Increase in the tax rate Figure 1 reports the results for the case of adjustment in the tax
rate  . Panels A and C show that the e¤ectiveness of a 1% increase in the tax rate does not depend
on the values of  and Z and such a policy remains an attractive option to the government if the
governments goal is to decrease probability of a debt crisis.
Panels B and D show how the relative importance of the multiplier and direct e¤ect in driving the
e¤ects of an increase in taxes changes as we vary  and Z. As predicted in Section 5 the importance
of the multiplier e¤ect increases as  increases and tends to decrease as Z increases (though in the
latter case the role of the multiplier e¤ect tends to increase for large values of Z).
These results show that the conclusion regarding the e¤ectiveness of an increase in tax rate
reported in the main paper is robust. They also support the intuition regarding the importance
of the multiplier e¤ect provided in Section 5.
Fiscal Stimulus Figure 1 reports the results for the case of scal stimulus nanced with short-
term debt. Panel A shows that while at higher  the increase in the probability of default following
a stimulus is lower this e¤ect is small (the increase in probability of default falls from 1:58% when
 = 0:3 to 1:43% when  = 0:5). Panel C show that varying Z has almost no e¤ect on the e¤ectiveness
of a scal stimulus (the increase in the probability of default is equal to 1:59% when Z = 0:85 to 1:54%
when Z = 0:95). It might be somewhat surprising that varying  has such a modest e¤ect on the
results. The reason why the e¤ect of higher  is so modest can be deduced from expression 9 reported
in Section B of this Appendix. On the one hand, it is true that a higher  tends to increase the
direct e¤ect since it increases the sum of the two rst terms (which capture the concavity e¤ect and
the di¤erential increase in tax revenues). On the other hand, a higher  also increases the desired
borrowing by the government since it increases Y2 relative to Y1 which tends to increase the B2. Higher
desired borrowing also means that the interest rate that the government sets before it decides on its
further policies also increases. This further increases supply of funds, and hence B2. The increase in
the amount the government borrows tends to decrease expression 9 counter-acting the positive e¤ect
described above.
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(a) The change in the probability of default as 
varies.
(b) The contiburion of the multiplier e¤ect as 
varies.
(c) The change in the probability of default as Z
varies.
(d) The contiburion of the multiplier e¤ect as Z
varies.
Figure 1: The e¤ect of a 1% increase in  as  and Z vary.
Panels B and D show how the relative importance of the multiplier e¤ect varies with  and Z.
The importance of the multiplier e¤ect increases as  increases and tends to decrease as Z increases
(though in the latter case the role of the multiplier e¤ect tends to increase for large values of Z). Note
that these results are qualitatively and quantitatively very similar to the results reported above for the
increase in the tax rate. This strongly indicates that the results concerning the relative importance
of the multiplier e¤ect are robust across di¤erent government policies.
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